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Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global
Theater: Emerging Complexities of
Transborder Expression
Timothy Zick

65 Vand. L. Rev. 125 (2012)

We have entered an era in which potentially harmful
expression can be distributed around the world in an instant. In the
emerging global theater, speakers and audiences are connected
through new and proliferating media; communicative space and
time are compressed to an extraordinary degree; domestic expression
can implicate national security and foreign affairs concerns; and a
new model of global information dissemination is developing in
which speakers are sometimes located beyond the jurisdiction of
nations that may be harmed by their communications and
disclosures.
This Article examines the First Amendment complexities
associated with the dissemination of potentially harmful
information in the global theater. These complexities include global
dissemination of offensive expression, incitement to unlawful
activities abroad, enemy-aiding expression that crosses territorial
borders, and global free press concerns. The author argues that
traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles ought
generally to apply in the global theater. Reliance on marketplace
and self-governance principles, application of speech-protective
incitement standards, and continued support for an expansive and
robust conception of press freedoms will preserve transborder First
Amendment liberties in the digital era and allow the global theater
to develop and mature. The author urges government officials not to
react to potentially dangerous global theater expression by adopting
new restrictions on transborder expressive and associational
activities; creating new criminal offenses that inhibit transborder
information flow; establishing broad penalties relating to
transborder commingling and association; resorting to extrajudicial
and potentially extralegal penalties for dangerous speakers; or
imposing new limits on press freedoms.
In addition to these specific First Amendment issues, the
Article also discusses several broader concerns relating to the
development of the global theater. The author contends that in the

global theater era, it will be critically important to the protection of
speech and press liberties that officials and courts act with due
regard for the First Amendment's transborder dimension. Moreover,
in the global theater, First Amendment justifications should be
interpreted to encompass global information flow, cross-border
collaboration, and the global spread of democratic principles. More
attention must also be paid to the unique legal, professional, ethical,
and identity challenges the press will face in the global theater.
Finally, the author urges that more careful legal and scholarly
attention be given to new restrictions on global information flow,
including actions of private intermediaries and nonconventional
forms of government censorship.
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INTRODUCTION

Justice Holmes once wrote, "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic." 1 As recent events have demonstrated,
the geographic contours of that theater have expanded beyond U.S.
territorial borders. Owing to globalization, digitization of expression,
and other forces, the world has become increasingly interconnected.
The global soapbox the Supreme Court alluded to in 1997, when
striking down Congress's first attempt to restrict speech on the
Internet, has now materialized in the United States and abroad. 2
Speakers' voices and the physical and psychological effects of domestic
expressive activities now frequently traverse or transcend territorial
borders.
As Holmes indicated in the same passage quoted above, "[T]he
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done." 3 Consider in that light the circumstances of the following recent
events, which highlight some of the First Amendment complexities
associated with the emerging global theater:
• A pastor from Gainesville, Florida, threatened to burn
copies of the Koran to mark the anniversary of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As a result,
President Obama, among other high-level officials,
called on the pastor to desist. 4 Several people in
Mghanistan, who had heard of the pastor's plans,

1.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 868, 870, 885 (1997) (describing the Internet as "a
unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication" and a "new marketplace of
ideas" containing "vast democratic forums" from which "any person with a phone line can become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox").
3.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
4.
Damien Cave & Anne Barnard, Minister Wavers on Plans to Burn Koran, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2010, at A3; Jack Healy & Steven Erlanger, Planned Koran Burning Drew
International Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/
10react.html?scp=1&sq=Planned%20Koran%20Burning"/o20Drew%20International%20Scorn&st
=nyt&pagewanted=l.
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protested and died during the ensuing riots. 5 When the
pastor later followed through and burned a copy of the
Koran, several more people died abroad. 6
Mter posting a satirical poster on the web urging
readers to participate in "Everybody Draw Mohammed
Day," a Seattle-based cartoonist received foreign death
threats and was forced into hiding. 7
As a result of the Supreme Court ruling in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, U.S. citizens who file
petitions with the United Nations on behalf of, provide
legal training to, or even post supportive material on the
web about designated "foreign terrorist organizations"
may be prosecuted under federal laws prohibiting the
prov1s10n of "material support" to terrorists. 8
Additionally, individuals undertaking these actions
could also be subject to prosecution for treason. 9
Mter a radical Muslim cleric named Anwar Al-Aulaqi,
who was a U.S. citizen residing in Yemen, posted
several videos and speeches on the Internet that praised
and encouraged terrorist attacks in the United States
and abroad, YouTube removed some of the cleric's
videos from its site and the Obama Administration
targeted him for execution. (The cleric was recently
killed in a drone strike.) 10

5.
Rod Nordland, 2 Afghans Are Killed in Protests over Koran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010,
at All (reporting that five people had been killed in Afghanistan during protests of the proposed
Koran burning in Florida).
6.
Taimoor Shah & Rod Nordland, Afghans Protest Koran Burning for Third Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A5.
7.
Brian Stelter, Cartoonist in Hiding After Death Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at
A14.
8.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
9.
Id.
10. A federal judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by the cleric's father challenging the targeted
killing of his son on standing and other justiciability grounds. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). Al-Aulaqi was killed on September 30, 2011, as a result of an American drone
attack in Yemen. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born
Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at Al.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

128

[Vol. 65:1:125

•

Mter Julian Assange, the publisher of the foreign
website WikiLeaks, shared classified documents
concerning American military operations in Iraq and
Mghanistan and American diplomatic cables with
several Western news outlets and posted them on the
Internet, U.S. officials suggested that he should be
treated as a terrorist or prosecuted under the Espionage
Act of 1917.1 1
As the proposed Koran-burning episode shows, domestic speech
can have instantaneous and even deadly international effects.
Further, as the Seattle cartoonist learned, U.S. residents who post
messages on the Internet must now consider not only the possibility of
domestic hecklers but foreign ones as well. 12 In the emerging global
theater, speech and association that originates inside the United
States but crosses territorial borders may cause violence in distant
locations, upset delicate foreign policy objectives and relationships,
and aid foreign enemies. All of this may occur without the speaker
ever departing from his location or even leaving his desk. Foreign
speakers, including U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad, may
direct enemy-aiding expression to all corners of the globe via the
Internet. Finally, as the WikiLeaks episode demonstrates, once
confidential state information has leaked across territorial borders,
efforts to control its global distribution will prove substantially more
difficult, if not futile.
Traditional First Amendment doctrines and jurisprudence did
not develop in a global theater. Rather, they developed in a domestic
sphere in which expression and its effects stayed largely within
territorial borders. The distribution of potentially harmful expression
in the global theater raises important and unresolved questions. Can
the government prosecute a domestic speaker for inciting a riot half a
world away? If the answer depends, as Justice Holmes indicated, on
matters of "proximity and degree," how should courts and
commentators analyze those characteristics in the twenty-first
century's digital age? 13 If hecklers thousands of miles away can chill
speakers in the United States, what are the implications for domesticspeech marketplaces and the ability of citizens to communicate via
11. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars
Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A18 (discussing the possibility that the
Justice Department will prosecute Julian Assange).
12. See J. David Goodman, Syrian Activists Abroad Speak of Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2011, at A10 (reporting that the State Department is investigating allegations that the Syrian
government has intimidated and harassed activists living in the United States).
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

2012] FALSELY SHOUTING FIRE IN A GLOBAL THEATER

129

global networks? Are citizens who merely advocate in favor of
terrorism or support terrorist organizations by publishing favorable
commentary about them on the web subject to criminal prosecution for
providing material support to terrorists? Are they subject to criminal
prosecution for treason? 14 To what extent will citizens' First
Amendment liberties actually be protected when they speak from
distant locations? Are foreign publishers subject to U.S. espionage and
other national security laws? If so, might the First Amendment's free
speech and press guarantees also protect them?
Speakers and officials will have to grapple with these and other
questions in the emerging global theater. More broadly, our society
will have to pay much closer attention to the First Amendment's
relationship to transborder expression. In the emerging global theater,
long-standing domestic
commitments to
marketplace
and
counterspeech principles, as well as old-fashioned principles of
speaker fortitude, will be severely tested by changed expressive
conditions and new regulatory challenges. Courts will have to consider
legal and constitutional conceptions (e.g., incitement, hostile
audiences, treason, and terrorism) in light of, and in some cases
adapted to, the unique circumstances of the global theater. Further,
regulatory challenges presented by the transborder distribution of
potentially harmful expression will test the government's
commitments to both the freedoms of speech and press and to the rule
of law. As the potential harm from transborder speech and association
increases, governments will seek new means of control. New forms of
speech regulation, censorship, and civil disobedience will arise in the
emerging global theater.
This Article examines some of the constitutional and regulatory
complexities that have emerged in the global theater. Part I briefly
describes the characteristics of the new expressive environment, with
a particular focus on potentially harmful speech in the global theater.
Although globalization, interconnectivity, and the compression of
space and time will facilitate speech, press, and associationalliberties,
these global theater characteristics will also produce substantial risks
for governments and their citizens.
Part II analyzes some of the free speech, association, and press
issues that have already arisen or are likely to arise in the global
14. See Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999,
1027-28 (2005) (observing that the law of treason has developed such that a broad category of
enemy-aiding expression might be deemed treasonous); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:

Generally Applicable Laws, illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1341-42 (2005) (discussing the potential application
of treason law to antiwar and other speech that could aid enemies of the United States).
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theater. My particular focus will be on expression and association that
may lead to harmful transborder effects. I will make four general
claims. First, although in rare instances the government could punish
domestic incitement despite its distant effects, expression that
breaches global peace or order by producing extraterritorial offense
and other harmful effects ought generally to remain fully protected in
the global theater. Second, the instantaneous transborder flow of
offensive speech will place additional burdens on both speakers and
authorities. As a result, speakers will have to more carefully assess in
advance whether they will risk the possibility of harm from distant
threats, and officials ought (in some cases) to be prepared to offer
reasonable protection to offensive domestic speakers who are faced
with threats from foreign hecklers. Third, it is critical that legislatures
and courts define the expanding category of proscribed enemy-aiding
expression, which now includes providing "material support" to
terrorists in the form of legitimizing and supportive communications
as well as cybertreason as narrowly as possible. In general, the United
States should draft and enforce national security laws such that
intentional enemy-aiding conduct, rather than speech, is proscribed.
Fourth, with regard to the transborder exposure of governmental
secrets, the United States ought to focus primarily upon improving its
processes for protecting secrecy rather than on prosecuting the
publishers, whether foreign or domestic, of confidential or secret
governmental information.
Part III draws more general First Amendment lessons from
recent global theater controversies. In the emerging global theater, it
is critical that courts, officials, and commentators begin to think more
systematically about transborder speech, association, and press
concerns. U.S. policymakers, litigants, and scholars must incorporate
the First Amendment's transborder dimension into political, legal, and
constitutional discussions regarding global information flow in the
twenty-first century. As our society maps the First Amendment's
transborder dimension, America's exceptional regard for offensive
expression is likely to come under increasing challenges at home and
abroad. We will thus have to explain, and likely defend, our longstanding free speech principles and values to both domestic and global
audiences. But we need not abandon traditional First Amendment
commitments in response to the potential dangers of transborder
expression and association. Indeed, recent episodes have confirmed
that core First Amendment principles, including marketplace
justifications for free speech, remain critically important in the
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emerging global theater. 15 There are also various lessons for the press,
an institution that is likely to continue its transformation from a
domestic information hub to a loosely bound international distribution
network. As this transformation occurs, the press will need to be more
circumspect in its reporting on matters of global concern. As new
sources and publishers, operating on different models and in pursuit
of different missions, continue to materialize, they will test the press's
commitment to the free flow of information. Finally, new threats to
free speech and information flow will arise in the global theater. As
recent global theater controversies indicate, we ought to pay more
attention to private intermediaries and the extent to which they can
disrupt the transborder flow of information. We should also be mindful
of the effects that new forms of governmental information control,
such as prosecution of information distributors and extrajudicial
targeted killing, may have on transborder information flow.

I. THE EMERGING GLOBAL THEATER
Global channels of speech, press, and association have become
tightly interconnected.l 6 Globalization, digitization, and the
proliferation of media outlets blur the lines between domestic- and
foreign-speech marketplaces. At home, abroad, and in cyberspace,
citizens increasingly participate in global debates and enter
relationships with aliens who are located abroad. The full implications
of this emerging global theater are beyond the scope of this Article. My
more modest goal in Parts I and II is to focus on the basic
characteristics and complexities of this emerging global marketplace,
particularly as they relate to potentially harmful forms of expression
and association. Part III addresses some of the broader lessons that
have emerged from early events in the global theater.

15. The marketplace idea or metaphor is generally thought to have originated in the work
of John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978)
(1859). For elaborations of the metaphor, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market.") and ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 559-66 (1969).
16. See, e.g., DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 90-99 (2009) (discussing Internet and network connectivity); Usage and Population
Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2011) (collecting worldwide Internet usage statistics).
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A. Interconnectiuity
Global interconnectivity is the defining characteristic of free
speech, press, and association in the twenty-first century.17 A speaker
who intends to, or appears to, address a small local community may in
fact speak to a global audience. Further, people around the globe can
feel, sometimes instantaneously, the tangible and psychological effects
of domestic speech and association. Of course, cross-border
communication flows into the United States as well. In many
instances, this occurs with the same relative ease and through the
same or similar channels of communication.
Several factors have contributed to an emerging global
expressive theater.l 8 These include the proliferation of media outlets;
expanded access to global communications networks; the
characteristics of modern media and news cycles-in particular the
penchant for focusing intensely on controversial statements or events
to the near-exclusion of all else; the ability to easily and cheaply store,
link to, and distribute digitized material and archives; and shared
language capabilities.
These forces have significantly blurred traditional lines
between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces. Owing to
transborder communications networks, domestic speakers and foreign
audiences are connected as never before. This connectivity is often
touted as a positive characteristic of the contemporary marketplace of
ideas-and it is. Among other things, global interconnectivity has the
potential to expose people to distant cultures; to broaden political,
scientific, and cultural fields of inquiry and debate; and to expand
opportunities for transborder association and collaboration. In terms
of free speech, these connections facilitate self-governance on a global
scale. They also contribute to a vigorous exchange of ideas in global
forums. As Jack Balkin observed, because interconnectivity expands
opportunities for public participation in creative and other endeavors

17. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP.
L. REV. 427 (2009).
18. To be clear, I am not claiming that a global marketplace of ideas presently exists.
Repressive regimes and other limitations obviously prevent such a marketplace from fully
forming and functioning. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 92-95 (2006) (discussing Chinese Internet filtering
technologies). Rather, my claim is that transborder information flow is creating a global
marketplace in which more and more of the world's population may participate. See RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 352 (1992) (suggesting that "the new technologies
that increasingly knit the globe into one giant electronic village will tend to create an
international marketplace for free speech").
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it may ultimately lead to the spread of "democratic culture." 19 From a
cosmopolitan perspective, these are all positive developments.
However, we must also recognize the potential harms that
might attend interconnectivity. One frequently noted adverse effect is
the proliferation of hate speech and advocacy of violence, particularly
on the Internet.2o Governments will have a difficult time effectively
regulating this sort of potentially harmful expression in the global
theater. Nations differ with regard to the extent of protection afforded
such expression.2 1 Receiving nations that do not provide protection for
hate speech, constitutionally or otherwise, cannot always intercept or
suppress hateful expression that crosses the border from a nation in
which such speech is constitutionally protected. 22 Thus, for example,
protected hate speech hosted on a U.S. website may be simultaneously
available in France and Germany, countries that prohibit distribution
of such material.23 Moreover, in some cases speakers will be able to
hide their locations and identities from authorities. In general,
harmful expression will flow freely across borders in the global
theater.

B. The Compression of Space and Time
One particular complexity related to harmful transborder
expression is that the elements of communicative space and time are
compressed. Speech that originates inside the United States may
quickly inflame passions in communities across the globe. Whereas it
used to take days, weeks, or even longer for a local event or statement
to have any impact beyond U.S. borders, in the emerging global
theater worldwide exposure and reaction are sometimes
instantaneous. In the digital age, audiences need not be physically
present to be instantly aware of, or even psychologically affected or
inflamed by, communications originating thousands of miles away.
Under these circumstances, it is possible that a domestic speaker
19. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 34-38 (2004}.
20. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 818-20 (2001}.
21. See id. at 858-63 (discussing approaches to Internet hate speech in various western
democracies).
22. See id. at 858-59 (noting, in particular, that the United States' protection of hateful
expression complicates other nations' efforts to regulate it).
23. In such circumstances, it may not even be clear which nation's laws apply to the speech
in question. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing the enforceability of a French judgment ordering a U.S. website
to prevent the display of Nazi memorabilia for sale in France).
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could incite a riot or successfully precipitate imminent violence across
the globe.
Owing to the compression of space and time, seemingly local
and provincial concerns can immediately become topics of global
interest. The plan to burn the Koran produced not just a local and
national reaction, but an international debate regarding tolerance for
hateful speech and the power of governments to proscribe deeply
offensive expression. Opposition to the proposed construction of an
Islamic center blocks from Ground Zero in Manhattan (the so-called
"Ground Zero Mosque") was reported and commented upon by both
domestic and international news outlets. 24 In the global theater, with
its transborder media amplifier, local events may garner a level of
attention that is disproportionate to their actual significance.
Although foreigners may have no tangible or political connection to an
issue, incendiary local expression may quickly become a matter of
concern to a global audience.
Many audiences live in places that do not embrace America's
exceptional protection for hateful, offensive, and other harmful forms
of expression. The compression of space and time may leave little
opportunity for speakers to soberly reflect on the messages they
convey. Moreover, although many speakers and audiences in the
global theater share a common language, the danger of mistranslation
and misunderstanding is unfortunately quite real. Depending to some
degree on the nature of national and international media coverage,
foreign audiences might mistakenly assume that noisy domestic
opposition to something like a proposed Islamic center communicates
the sentiments of the public at large or even the U.S. government.
Communications via transborder networks will lead to more frequent
24. See, e.g., Gary Bauer, Ground Zero Mosque Would Embolden Our Enemy, HUMAN
EVENTS, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38445#; Brian Montopoli,
"Ground Zero Mosque" Developer Sharif El-Gamal: No Money from Iran, Hamas,
CBSNEWS.COM,
Aug.
27,
2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20014959503544.html; Jillian Scharr, Jewish Leaders Gather to Support Ground Zero Mosque, NBC N.Y.,
Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/newsllocal-beat/Jewish-Leaders-Gather-to-SupportGround-Zero-Mosque-100049479.html; Tom Topousis, Landmark Vote on Ground Zero Mosque,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattanllandmark_vote_on_
ground_zero_mosque_7iWKADGQOOhZKHkpSdxYWN; Erica Werner, Obama Backs Mosque
THE
INDEPENDENT,
Aug.
14,
2010,
Near
Ground
Zero,
http://www.independent.co.uklnews/world!americaslobama-backs-mosque-near-ground-zero2052608.html. Reaction in a variety of Arab news outlets is reported in Catherine Dagger, The
Ground Zero Mosque-What the Arab Press is Saying About the Ground Zero Mosque
Controversy, AsSOCIATED CONTENT, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/5706656/the_ground_zero_mosque_what_the_arab.html?cat=54 and in What the Arab
Papers Say, ECONOMIST ONLINE, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbookl
2010/08/arab _reactions_cordoba_mosque.
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global culture clashes. Some of these controversies will result in
violent, or even deadly, reactions from foreign audiences.

C. Domestic Expression, National Security, and Foreign Affairs
One of the consequences of interconnectivity and the
compression of space and time is the increased potential for domestic
expression to affect the Global War on Terror and foreign affairs.
Again, this is a product of the blurring of traditional territorial lines
between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces.
In the United States, political pundits and commentators
across the political spectrum often articulate some version of the
following argument: ''Your speech will embolden our enemies, harm
our troops, undermine national interests abroad, or legitimize
terrorism." 25 Some commentators and editorialists even press the
point further, arguing that some forms of domestic political dissent
and protest are themselves treasonous. 26 In the global theater, even
the most provincial conflicts can quickly give rise to charges of
providing aid to foreign terrorist organizations or even treason. Thus,
domestic proponents of the Islamic center in Manhattan charged
opponents with aiding terrorists or harming American troops in
foreign locations by voicing anti-Islamic sentiments likely to reach
foreign audiences. 27 In the global theater, such charges may
proliferate.
Of course, most-if not all-claims that such speech is
treasonous can be dismissed as pure political rhetoric or hyperbole;
overblown and baseless charges of treasonous speech and association
are hardly new in American politics. Throughout our history, domestic
protest and offensive speech have always posed some indeterminate
threat to foreign military operations and foreign relations. In the preglobal-theater era, the claim that domestic political speech would
actually provide some concrete or meaningful assistance to foreign
enemies seemed in most cases to be farfetched. But, as the examples
25. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 24 (claiming that building the proposed Islamic center in
lower Manhattan would "embolden our enemy"); Editorial, Why President Obama Should Meet
with Dick Cheney, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/04/whypresident-obama-should-meet-with-dick-cheney.html (suggesting that former Vice President
Cheney's criticisms of President Obama were harming national security).
26. See, e.g., Editorial, Comfort and the Protesters, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.
nysun.com/editorials/comfort-and-the-protesters/77452/ (suggesting that antiwar protesters
might be guilty of treason).
27. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Anti-Mosque Organizers Giving Aid and Comfort to the
Enemy, ALTERNET.ORG (Aug. 31, 2010, 9:45AM), http:/lblogs.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/08/31/
anti-mosque-organizers-are-giving-aid-and-comfort-to-the-enemy/.
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discussed so far suggest, we have entered an era in which domestic
political speech and association may be perceived as posing a threat to
national security. Such concerns may be more difficult to dismiss in
the global-theater era.
As noted, communications in the global theater traverse
international borders with relative frequency and ease. They are more
likely to reach terrorists and other enemies abroad, in forms that are
useful to those individuals. Thus, a video file of a domestic protest in
the United States can easily become a hyperlink on a foreign
terrorist's website, providing a form of immediate aid in terms of
recruitment and communication. In a similar fashion, enemy forces in
the field might download a digitized file of confidential information
from the Internet. Access to this sort of information could indeed
increase the potential for harm to U.S. troops and assets both on
distant military battlefields and in other foreign locations. Thus, in an
extraordinary (perhaps unprecedented) gesture, President Obama
warned that a Florida pastor's plans to burn a Koran would be a
"recruitment bonanza for Al Qaeda" and could "greatly endanger our
young men and women in uniform who are in Iraq, who are in
Mghanistan."28
Similarly, robust and heated domestic communications might
have an effect on foreign relations. In addition to speaking out publicly
about the Florida pastor's plans, President Obama also voiced support
for a developer's right to build an Islamic center in Manhattan. 29
President Obama directed his statements not merely to restive
domestic audiences, but also to various foreign audiences who were
paying close attention to events in lower Manhattan. In the global
theater, presidents and other officials will likely feel pressed, as
President Obama apparently did, to denounce extremist views in
order to assure global audiences, including international leaders, that
the United States is committed to universal values of dignity,
tolerance, and equality.
Moreover, in the emerging global theater, U.S. citizens will
increasingly seek to engage and participate in transborder association
and collaboration. Typical transborder contacts will range from
commercial ventures, to humanitarian relief projects, to collaborations
within established international human rights institutions and
communities. These contacts will create opportunities for the
trans border sharing of information and viewpoints.
28. Cave & Barnard, supra note 4.
29. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Strongly Backs Islam Center Near 9111 Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2010, at AI.
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However, there is a potentially dangerous side to these
transborder contacts. Some may be criminal enterprises or violent
conspiracies. Of course, this is also true of some purely domestic or
intraterritorial associations and collaborations. Under a provincial
interpretation of the First Amendment, transborder collaboration is
treated as presumptively suspect. In part, this relates to the foreign
affairs and national security concerns discussed above. 30 In the global
theater, the government may seek to rely upon foreign affairs and
national security concerns to restrict any domestic speech or
association that Congress and/or the State Department believe could
negatively affect relationships with U.S. allies.

D. New Regulatory Challenges in the Emerging Global Theater
The emerging global theater will create substantial regulatory
challenges insofar as harmful speech and association are concerned.
Citizens located within the United States and abroad will have more
opportunities to propagandize and otherwise aid foreign enemies
through communications distributed on the Internet. The frequency,
substance, and potential harmful effects of these communications will
challenge a government's commitment to traditional free speech
principles in the emerging global theater. In many cases,
interconnectivity and digitization will render efforts to suppress
harmful expression, including closely guarded government secrets,
futile.
In the predigital era, a citizen who wished to effectively
propagandize on behalf of a foreign enemy generally had to travel
abroad in order to use the enemy's dedicated channels of
communication. 31 Today, these citizens can access shared networks
from anywhere in the world. In the global theater, citizens do not need
to leave the country, or even their living rooms, to actively
propagandize on behalf of an enemy or provide material support to a
foreign terrorist group. Further, citizens who wish to distribute
harmful information to American or international enemies are no
longer limited to press conferences, face-to-face meetings, and other
methods likely to reach relatively limited domestic and foreign

30. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (upholding
"material-support" laws as applied to transborder collaboration, based in part on foreign affairs
and national security concerns).
31. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1007 (noting that in several World War II-era treason cases,
defendants "had to travel overseas and use the radio broadcasting facilities of U.S. enemies to
reach the audiences they targeted, whether U.S. armed forces abroad or the masses back home").
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audiences. 32 With access to the Internet, citizens at home and abroad
can threaten U.S. interests by posting speeches, videos, and other
information to global information networks.
One of the most pressing challenges to governmental
regulation of transborder information flow in the global theater
concerns the publication of government secrets.33 From his base in
Switzerland, WikiLeaks' publisher, Julian Assange, shared diplomatic
cables and detailed information regarding U.S. battlefield operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan with several western newspapers. 34 Assange,
who allegedly obtained the information from a private in the U.S.
Army (who himself allegedly procured the information illegally and is
being prosecuted by the U.S. government for his actions), posted some
of the material on the WikiLeaks website. 35 According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, some of this information may have
compromised military missions and covert agents working in the
field. 36 The White House and State Department decried the release of
diplomatic cables, suggesting that the disclosures endangered
diplomatic relations and lives. 37 Subsequently, the U.S. Justice
Department opened a criminal investigation targeting Assange and
WikiLeaks. 38
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, anyone with an Internet
connection and access to secret or confidential information can cheaply
and widely distribute this information. Technological channels of
communication not subject to direct control by U.S. officials are
rapidly replacing traditional transborder information platforms like
the U.S. Mail and other heavily regulated telecommunications outlets.
This raises additional regulatory complexities, particularly where
foreign actors have breached governmental secrecy and information
has traversed international borders and appeared on the Internet. In
the global theater, damaging information does not simply disappear

32. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1981) (describing a U.S. citizen's public
overseas campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency).
33. See Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at WK1
(discussing government efforts to protect secrets in the modern age).
34. Scott Shane, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2010, at Al.
35. Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry Into WikiLeaks Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2010, at A4.
36. See The Defense Department's Response, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A9.
37. Ginger Thompson, Officials Assail WikiLeaks and Try to Curb Damage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gstlfullpage.html?res=9COCEODA1331F93AA15752
C1A9669D8B63&scp=1&sq=Officials%20Assail%20WikiLeaks%20and%20Try"/o20to%20Curb%2
ODamage&st=cse.
38. See Savage, supra note 11.
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and often cannot be destroyed. Rather, the information and raw data
are likely to survive on mirror sites and in encrypted files that the
government cannot access or regulate. 39 Once someone posts
information on the web, it may be impossible to prevent others from
copying and distributing it. Criminal prosecution may deter future
leakers or publishers, but it will not cure the damage from disclosure
or ensure that the information is scrubbed from the global record.
In the global theater, it will be more difficult for the
government to control or regulate citizens' transborder speech and
association activities. Acute regulatory problems may arise when
citizens convey potentially harmful messages from beyond U.S.
borders. In an appropriate case, the government might revoke a
citizen's passport based upon harmful speech or speech activities
abroad. 40 However, traditional means of regulation will likely be
ineffectual when applied to a citizen dedicated to harming the United
States from beyond its borders.
Thus, officials will seek new regulatory methods in an effort to
stem the flow of harmful expression, including terrorist expression.
For example, federal officials have pressured domestic Internet
intermediaries to remove alleged terrorist expression and sensitive
government reports from their servers. Federal prosecutors may seek
indictments against domestic- or foreign-information distributors. As
noted earlier, in at least one instance, President Obama issued an
order targeting an American citizen for execution based in part on
incendiary Internet posts advocating terrorist violence in the U.S. and
abroad. 41 We could now be witnessing the beginning of a
transformation from a regulatory model, which is based upon state
prosecution and punishment of harmful acts and expression, to a
model that relies upon suppression by private intermediaries,
punishment of information distributors, and extrajudicial killings.

II. DANGEROUS EXPRESSION IN THE GLOBAL THEATER
A number of free speech, association, and press issues will
arise as foreign and domestic speakers transmit harmful expression in
the emerging global theater. This Part considers the application of
First Amendment doctrines and principles relating to harmful
39. See Ravi Somaiya, Hundreds of WikiLeaks Mirror Sites Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2010, at A12.
40. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (upholding the revocation of a citizen's
passport based in part on the nature of his overseas expression).
41. See Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 10 (describing background relating to
President Obama's decision to order a targeted killing).
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expression in the global theater. Specifically, I will address the
following threats to global public order: offensive and incendiary
domestic expression; "enemy-aiding'' expression; and the global
distribution of confidential government information. In most
instances, courts can readily adapt existing First Amendment
doctrines and principles to new circumstances in order to address
some of these issues. In other contexts, however, the fit may not be as
seamless. In those instances, courts and other officials will have to
consider how to shape and interpret our First Amendment in the
global theater. Part III moves from these doctrinal concerns to some
broader themes or lessons regarding the development of the global
theater.
A. Breaches of Global Peace and Order

In the emerging global theater, there is an increased likelihood
that domestic speech, some of which was originally intended solely for
domestic audiences, will produce extraterritorial psychological and
physical harm. As explained in Part I, local disputes may well be
flashpoints for global riots and other conflicts. Courts and
commentators have not yet considered how the First Amendment will
apply to breaches of global, as opposed to purely local, peace and
order. This Section addresses First Amendment doctrines as they
relate to transborder offense, hostile foreign audiences, and
transborder incitement.
1. Transborder Offense and Hostile Audience Reaction

Under settled First Amendment doctrine, mere offensiveness is
not a proper ground for regulating or suppressing a speaker's
message. 42 As mentioned earlier, the stakes associated with
transborder offense could be substantially higher than those
associated with offensive speech confined to localities or domestic
territorial boundaries. Foreign audience reactions to offensive
domestic expression could include deadly riots and may otherwise
implicate foreign affairs and national security concerns. The central
question is as follows: Should these circumstances produce some
fundamental change regarding the First Amendment's treatment of
offensive domestic expression? For a number of reasons, that question
ought to be answered in the negative.

42. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invalidating a breach-of-peace
conviction based on the wearing of an offensive jacket in a courthouse corridor).
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Consider, for example, the Koran burning that occurred in
Gainesville, Florida. In the United States, a speaker can generally
convey a message by burning items, such as the national flag, a draft
card, or a cross. 43 The government may regulate or prohibit these and
other forms of expressive or symbolic conduct in only two relatively
narrow circumstances: If the burning of the object conveys an
unprotected message of some sort, such as a true threat, then it may
be subject to sanction. 44 It would also be appropriate and
constitutional for local authorities to require a permit or otherwise
insist that the Koran burning comply with content-neutral public
order and safety laws.45 However, governments may not prohibit
expressive activity just because the message's content is offensive or
otherwise disapproved of. 46 The mere fact that the burning of an item
expresses disdain for the United States, disagreement with national
policies or leaders, or even the toxic notion of white supremacy is not,
without more, a valid ground for prohibiting the expressive act. 47
These fundamental principles would apply to the burning of
sacred religious texts (e.g., the Bible, the Koran, or the Torah). 48 Thus,
the government cannot impose a sanction merely because the message
was intended to, or would in fact, offend a substantial number of
people in the local community, the state, or the nation. Nor would the
mere possibility that a local audience might react violently to this
form of expression, or suffer psychological discomfort as a result of it,
provide any valid ground for suppressing the symbolic act. 49

43. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft card).
44. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (noting that some cross burnings may be punished as
true threats).
45. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
46. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 385 ("[N]onverbal expressive activity can be banned because of
the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses ....").
47. This conclusion is obviously based upon current First Amendment doctrine. Some
commentators might argue that such hateful speech, whether directed at domestic or foreign
audiences, ought to be proscribed. Cf. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, And Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
48. Although this is long-settled doctrine, some U.S. commentators nevertheless suggested
that Pastor Jones might be arrested for his symbolic act. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, The
Bonfire of the Qurans, VDARE.COM (Sept. 9, 2010), http://vdare.com/buchanan/100909
_qurans.htm (suggesting that President Obama send marshals to arrest Pastor Jones); M.J.
Rosenberg, Can Feds Just Arrest the Quran Burner?, THE BUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www .huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/can -feds-just-arrest-the_b_710894.html
(asking
whether federal authorities could arrest Pastor Jones).
49. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
("undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" is not sufficient to overcome the right of
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As the Koran burning demonstrates, in the global theater,
speakers will frequently convey offensive and incendiary expression
across vast distances and to foreign audiences. Some expression that
originates in the United States will inevitably deeply offend or even
psychologically harm many members of those audiences. Some foreign
listeners or viewers will react violently to domestic expression, as
many Mghans did when they learned of the planned and later
executed Koran burning. so
However, the mere fact that some portion of a worldwide
audience might experience some offense or psychological discomfort as
a result of, or even engage in rioting in response to, an act of domestic
expression is not a valid basis for restricting or proscribing the
message. 51 The principles of the speech marketplace should apply
wherever the speech is distributed. Thus, foreign audiences, like
domestic ones, should be encouraged to engage in counterspeech
(subject, of course, to their own sovereign's public-order laws and
doctrines). Simply put, the negative reaction of an audienceregardless of its location-ought not to be considered a valid basis for
restricting domestic expression.
Sometimes, offensive expression that originates in the United
States but is conveyed by speakers in the global theater will implicate
delicate foreign affairs and national security concerns. However, for a
number of reasons, we ought to apply traditional First Amendment
principles even when vituperative, bigoted, or otherwise offensive
domestic expression may complicate or affect U.S. interests abroad. 52
First, any interference with the federal government's foreign affairs
and military functions from this offensive expression is likely to be
marginal or minimal, thus falling short of the compelling interest
necessary to uphold a content-based restriction on domestic
expression. 53 Second, insofar as any putative foreign affairs
justification for regulation is based upon offense taken by foreign
leaders, allies, or diplomats, U.S. courts cannot deem this justification
compelling for the previously stated reason-namely, the justification
would still rest squarely upon the negative reaction of some audience.
free speech); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (noting the lack of evidence that
a courthouse audience was ready to strike Cohen for the offensive words on his jacket).
50. See supra notes 5-6.
51. This assumes, of course, that the speaker did not actually intend to incite an imminent
riot or other violence abroad-a scenario discussed below. See infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text.
52. With regard, in particular, to the enemy-aiding aspects of domestic speech, see infra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
53. Cf Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-25 (2010) (applying
demanding scrutiny to content-based restriction expression).
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Third, to the extent that domestic expression actually produces
international offense or strife, U.S. officials, including the President,
are constitutionally and otherwise empowered to clarify the position of
the United States and to engage in diplomatic efforts to repair any
damage to the nation's reputation. That would be a far less speechrestrictive alternative than punishing the offensive domestic speaker.
In some circumstances, transborder offense may result in
hostile foreign audience members threatening domestic speakers with
physical harm and violence. In the domestic-speech marketplace,
hostile audiences and hecklers sometimes attempt to interfere with
lawful First Amendment activities. The Supreme Court has indicated
that, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for authorities to
restrict speech in order to prevent a potentially violent audience from
causing imminent harm to the speaker. 54 However, the Court also
indicated in several subsequent cases that authorities cannot use the
mere existence of a hostile audience as justification for silencing a
speaker otherwise engaged in lawful expression. 55 Although the
Supreme Court has not said so explicitly, this later precedent could
impose some affirmative duty on officials to protect the speaker, at
least insofar as circumstances reasonably permit. 56
Like the incitement cases mentioned above, the so-called
hostile-audience cases involved domestic speech conveyed to
proximate, local audiences. The immediate concern was that someone
or some group of persons in the audience might react violently to the
speaker's message. To what extent do these audience-reaction
principles apply in the emerging global theater, where expression
frequently traverses borders and audiences may be located thousands
of miles away?
The fact that the early hostile-audience cases involved
physically proximate contention in public places is merely a reflection
54. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
55. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970) (reversing convictions for disorderly
conduct when it was impossible to determine if the grounds for the convictions were actual
disorderly conduct or the defendants' advocacy of unpopular ideas); Gregory v. City of Chicago,
394 U.S. 111 (1969) (holding that defendants marching peacefully to protest segregation could
not be convicted of disorderly conduct even when individuals watching the march became
unruly); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing the convictions of a group of African
Americans who refused to leave a public reading room); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(reversing the conviction of a speaker who spoke to a group of students peacefully marching to
protest segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that a group of
peacefully marching African Americans could not be convicted of breach of the peace).
56. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting "the implication of the
Court's opinion that the police had no obligation to protect petitioner's constitutional right to
talk" and arguing that "if, in the name of preserving order, [the police] ever can interfere with a
lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him").
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of social and historical circumstances. Street-corner speeches and
demonstrations were common forms of public expression and dissent
in the 1950s and 1960s. As noted, today's speech marketplace includes
rapid transborder exchanges and new forms of digital contention.
Owing to interconnectivity and compression of space and time, hostile
audiences and hecklers are now only a click away. Enemies can now
digitally transmit threats across territorial borders in an instant, and
there is at least the possibility that accomplices within the United
States can carry out such threats. The possibility of some violent
reaction to domestic expression from audiences abroad has become a
disturbing reality. As noted in the Introduction, federal officials urged
an American cartoonist to go into hiding after she received death
threats from persons located abroad in response to her Internet
posting calling on others to draw the Prophet Muhammad.
As discussed earlier, the mere fact that domestic expression
may offend some portion of an international audience is not a valid
ground for governmental suppression or restriction of speech. The
same principle ought to apply to speech that provokes an
interconnected audience to react hostilely toward the speaker. 57 Even
if the violent reaction were considered to be an imminent threat to the
speaker or to public order more generally, authorities should not order
a domestic speaker to desist in the face of foreign threats. In essence,
the rules of the global soapbox should be the same for cybercorner
speakers as they are for street-corner speakers.
The critical question is how to preserve domestic-speech rights
in the face of such distant threats. In the traditional hostile audience
situation, speakers are offered at least some assurance that
authorities will engage in reasonable efforts to protect them from
hostile reactions. In the global theater, those assurances will be much
weaker or nonexistent. Authorities will be hampered by geography,
distance, resource limitations, and jurisdictional complexities.
Obviously, officials cannot police the global theater or protect every
domestic speaker from global hostility.
However, in at least some cases, officials will be aware of
foreign threats of violence. If authorities are to fully protect domestic
speakers in their exercise of speech rights in the global theater, they
57. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("Nor do we have here an instance of the
exercise of the State's police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given
group to hostile reaction."); Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (''It is one thing to say that the police cannot
be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when
as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to
riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.").
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will have to provide additional security and protection in such cases.
The Seattle cartoonist ought not to be forced to remain in hiding under
an assumed identity, without any official protection or support, as a
result of her exercise of free speech rights. Providing such protection
could entail the expenditure of significant governmental resources.
Just as such expenses must be paid to ensure robust debate in public
places like streets and parks, governments may find that it is
necessary to provide some measure of financial and other support to
facilitate expression in the global theater. To be clear, my claim is not
that authorities have an affirmative constitutional obligation to
subsidize offensive speech in the global theater. However, insofar as
cybercorner speakers face hostile foreign audiences, they are entitled
to the same level or degree of protection as the street-corner
antagonist.
Ultimately, however, a substantial portion of the burdens
associated with hostile global audiences will fall upon domestic
speakers themselves. In traditional speech contexts, a speaker can
carefully choose her platform and audience. In real space and time,
the speaker is usually able to see and even hear potential hecklers.
She is able to gauge audience characteristics and immediate audience
reaction. Hence the speaker can decide to either alter or suppress a
message in response to circumstances on the ground. In the global
theater, speakers will often post messages on the Internet without
carefully considering the potential audience or knowing much about
audiences' expressive cultures. Contextual cues will be missing.
Messages will frequently be conveyed to a global audience of diverse
characteristics and viewpoints, with no way for speakers to gauge in
the moment how global audiences are receiving their messages.
Speakers who address particularly controversial matters in the
global theater will thus face some difficult challenges regarding selfcensorship. As the Seattle cartoonist discovered, violent hecklers can
be lurking anywhere in the global theater. If the global theater is to be
a robust speech marketplace, much will depend on speakers'
willingness to face the consequences of an uncertain degree of global
hostility. Speakers will have to balance their desire to address
controversial matters of global concern with their own psychological
comfort and physical safety. Participation in the global theater will
require degrees of speaker foresight and fortitude beyond that
necessary for participation in more traditional local or domestic
theaters.
The current degree of protection afforded to offensive
expression under the First Amendment establishes free speech norms
and principles for the United States and its communities. However, in
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the global theater, we must account for the now-obvious fact that
offensive expression will frequently reach global audiences. We should
not diminish the protection afforded to offensive domestic expression
as a result of foreign-audience reaction or foreign-speech norms. This
does not mean that the potential reaction of foreign audiences is
wholly irrelevant or of no concern whatsoever to domestic speakers or
U.S. officials. In the global theater, speakers must recognize that their
utterances are not likely to be confined to familiar territory in which
messages and speech norms are well understood. Authorities ought to
be aware both that domestic expression can impact national interests
abroad and that violent or threatening responses to domestic
expression may emanate from distant sources. Most importantly,
courts and officials ought not to abandon traditional marketplace
principles in the global theater. Rather, as discussed in Part III, we
ought to view events like the Koran burning and the hostile reaction
to the Seattle cartoonist as opportunities for a more open global
dialogue regarding free speech, tolerance, and comparative
constitutional values. ss
2. Transborder Incitement
The preceding discussion focused on the implications of
negative and harmful foreign reactions to transborder expression.
Suppose, however, that the speaker intends or causes a reaction more
serious than distant offense. Suppose instead that she specifically
intends through expression to incite violence or unlawful activity
beyond U.S. borders. Whether a speaker can be punished for
transborder incitement is an unresolved First Amendment question,
but one that we will inevitably have to answer in the global theater.
Regulation of the category of speech known as "incitement" has
long mediated a basic tension between allowing speakers to express
unpopular viewpoints and the power of the state to protect citizensand even the state itself-from violence and unlawful conduct. 59
Under the contemporary incitement standard, speech advocating
violence or other criminal action cannot be suppressed unless it is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely

58. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing that "a function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute" and that speech "may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger").
59. See Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 331-42 (1978) (discussing the evolution
of the incitement standard).
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to incite or produce such action." 60 To borrow Justice Holmes' famous
example, a speaker who falsely shouts fire in a public theater, causing
a riot or other disturbance, is not entitled to First Amendment
protection. 61
As Holmes recognized early on, incitement is generally a
question of "proximity and degree." 62 Proximity, in particular, has
been a key consideration in the development of incitement doctrine. As
a speaker comes ever closer to steeling an audience to actual violence,
the state's interest in regulation becomes correspondingly stronger. As
the Supreme Court observed in Dennis v. United States, the state is
not required to wait for the "putsch" to actually occur. 63 Rather, it may
take action to secure its assets, interests, and institutions prior to the
first shot being fired or the first act in furtherance of a conspiracy
taking place. Nevertheless, the modern requirements of imminence
and likelihood of harm impose serious constraints on the use of
preemptive governmental power in response to expression that may
produce public disorder, violence, and other unlawful activity. 64
From the early twentieth century to the present, the violence
and unlawful activity of greatest concern in the Supreme Court's
principal incitement cases were generally close at hand. Speakers and
audiences were typically in close proximity to one another. The assets,
interests, and institutions potentially affected by domestic expression,
such as antiwar and communist propaganda, were typically located
inside the United States.s5 Under twentieth century sedition,
antiradicalism, and other public-order and security laws, federal and
state officials generally sought to control the effects of speech intended
to arouse a local and physically proximate audience to unlawful
conduct or violence.
This is not to suggest that foreign elements or effects were
wholly irrelevant in early incitement cases. In particular, foreign
ideological influences, including socialism and commumsm, were
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44 7 (1969).
61. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
62. Id.
63. 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
64. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975) (calling the Brandenburg
formulation "the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court").
65. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (associating with others to teach
and advocate violent overthrow of government); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(advocating socialist uprising and overthrow of domestic government); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919) (giving a public speech with the intent to obstruct the military draft); Schenck,
249 U.S. at 49-51 (distributing pamphlets with the intent to interfere with military recruitment
and enlistment).
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central concerns in some cases. 66 Moreover, the potential for
disruption of military operations and threats to execution of U.S.
policies and missions abroad were clearly part of the concern in some
early incitement cases. 67 However, the overriding concern in the early
cases was not with remote deserters, foreign communists, or radical
terrorist cells operating in foreign nations. The principal-and, in
light of the speech at issue, most likely "imminent"-threats were
related to the orderly conduct of the domestic draft, continued
production of domestic munitions, and the survival of state and local
governments.
Suppose, however, that imminent harm is not likely to occur
nearby, in a particular locality, state, or even within the U.S. Rather,
suppose it is likely to occur, if at all, only in some distant location
thousands of miles from U.S. territorial borders. Does the incitement
doctrine apply to expression that is intended to and likely will produce
such nonproximate, but still potentially imminent, harmful effects?
Could the government prosecute a domestic speaker for inciting
violence or unlawful acts halfway around the world?
These questions made little sense in a world in which
communication traveled very slowly, if at all, across territorial
borders. However, owing to the characteristics of interconnectivity and
compression of space and time, whether a speaker might be
prosecuted and punished for transborder incitement is a close
question.
Although the dynamics of incitement have typically required
physical proximity between the speaker and the target audience,
digitization renders this factor far less critical. 68 Digitized expression
can cover substantial distances in near-real time.6 9 Thus, it can often
reach audiences located thousands of miles away in little more than
an instant. Moreover, digitized expression can include not only text
but also images and videos. Digitization and interconnectivity can
produce exchanges that are quite similar to face-to-face encounters.
66. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363-64 (noting influence of Moscow Third International
in defendants' teachings).
67. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-51 (upholding against a First Amendment challenge
the conviction of a defendant under the Espionage Act for circulating pamphlets advocating the
disruption of the military draft).
68. See Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and
Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (2007) (discussing the effects that
technologies, in particular computer networks, may have on the definition and regulation of
incitement).
69. This could impact the incitement analysis in cases where the audience is domestic but is
located some distance from the speaker. I focus here on the scenario involving audiences located
abroad.
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This increases the likelihood that audience passions will be inflamed,
missions will be efficiently and effectively coordj.pated, and orders will
be rapidly executed. Moreover, compression complicates the drawing
of clear lines between purely domestic or proximate threats and
foreign or distant threats to public order. Determining whether a
particular danger or harmful effect is imminent, proximate, or remote
in space or time (or both) may be difficult in the global theater.
Seemingly distant threats may be clearer, more vividly and
realistically present, despite their nonproximate physical origins, and
closer both in terms of space and time than they might otherwise
appear.
Owing to these considerations, it is at least plausible to include
expression disseminated across interconnected global networks in the
incitement category. Assuming both that a speaker intends by express
advocacy to incite a foreign audience to unlawful action and the
government can indeed show that such action is both imminent and
likely to occur, authorities could restrict, prevent, or punish
transborder communications in an effort to prevent foreign riots,
disturbances, damages, or unlawful acts that are likely to harm U.S.
assets, personnel, or interests abroad. 70 To be clear, I am not claiming
that the United States could generally proscribe mere advocacy of
unlawful action on the Internet. Indeed, I assume that under current
First Amendment standards it cannot. Nor am I otherwise questioning
the current incitement standard, which does not permit the outright
suppression of extremist rhetoric or the mere teaching of violence. 71
The narrower question is whether something we might call
transborder incitement could be punished within the existing First
Amendment framework. For the reasons stated, the answer is yes.
70. The fact that the U.S. assets or interests that are potentially imperiled by domestic
expression are located abroad ought not to make any difference. The United States can seek to
protect its foreign military and other interests from domestic interferences, whether these take
the form of tangible aid to enemies, unlawful possession of state secrets, or incitements to
unlawful action or violence. If the United States can prosecute foreign speakers based upon the
negative effects of their speech inside its territorial borders, surely it may prosecute a domestic
speaker who threatens imminent harm to its extraterritorial assets and interests. For
discussions of U.S. law and policy regarding extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, particularly
on the basis of domestic effects, see Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegali:ty and Geoambiguous Law: A
New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 125-30 (2010);
Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455,
1478-82 (2008); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2525 (2005).
Of course, the United States would not have an exclusive global police power under this theory.
Foreign riots and other disturbances would remain the concern of the states in which such acts
physically occurred. Rather, American power would extend only to restrictions on incitement,
whether it originates within the United States or abroad, which threatens U.S. assets and
interests located in foreign countries.
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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To be sure, prosecutions for transborder incitement are likely
to be exceedingly rare. Among other things, they would require
precision surveillance and impeccable timing by authorities. In order
to demonstrate imminent harm in a case in which unlawful conduct
has not yet occurred, the domestic speaker who intends to incite
violence in Mghanistan or Yemen may have to be apprehended at the
moment or just before he clicks "send." 72 A perhaps more serious
challenge would be for the government to prove that a foreign
audience actually stood ready to participate in imminent violence or
unlawful activity once the
message was communicated.
Interconnectivity certainly makes it easier to communicate inciting
messages across international borders. The compression of space and
time caused by digitized communication will speed the transmission of
such messages. However, the requirements of imminence and
likelihood of harm will pose serious practical and constitutional
obstacles to prosecuting digitally facilitated transborder incitement.
All of this assumes, of course, that the global theater will not
fundamentally alter the First Amendment incitement standard and its
traditional application. As scholars have noted, some with evident
disappointment, the current incitement standard essentially precludes
U.S. officials from restricting most of the extremist speech conveyed
over the Internet. 73 One question is whether, owing in substantial part
to the unique characteristics of the global theater and in particular
the emergence of the global threat of terrorism, courts and officials
will create a more flexible and less speech-protective incitement
standard that allows governments to restrict some extremist rhetoric
and advocacy. If a domestic or foreign speaker can incite or facilitate
violence against U.S. troops serving in foreign theaters from a desktop
in Des Moines, perhaps it is time that we reconsider the imminence
and likelihood elements of the current incitement standard. 74

72. Of course, this timing element could also affect a case involving a speaker in Brooklyn,
New York, who intends to incite violence across the bridge in Manhattan.
73. See, e.g., Tiffany Kamasara, Planting the Seeds of Hatred: Why Imminence Should No
Longer Be Required to Impose Liability on Internet Communications, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 835, 837
(2002).
74. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 120--25 (2006) (suggesting that imminence and other requirements under
Brandenburg may lack the necessary flexibility to address the threat of extremist expression);
Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233
(2005) (questioning whether the Brandenburg test will ultimately survive new threats to
security); Robert S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Preaching Terror: Free Speech or Wartime
Incitement?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 785, 790 (2006) (arguing that the incitement standard "should be
recast in the context of the War on Terror").

2012] FALSELY SHOUTING FIRE IN A GLOBAL THEATER

151

Here, then, is another context in which we will have to decide
whether to dilute traditional speech-protective standards in response
to the complexities of the global theater. One obvious difficulty is that
recalibrating the incitement standard as a counterterrorism measure
may ultimately affect a wide swath of currently protected domestic
advocacy and rhetoric. That may be a price some are willing to pay in
order to suppress potentially dangerous, hateful, and extremist
expression. However, we ought to remember that the incitement
standard was calibrated to protect criticism of government and
advocacy of unpopular viewpoints, particularly during times of global
turmoil and unrest. 75 Further, as it was with communism and
syndicalism, the root cause of terrorism is ideological. The early
incitement cases, as well as subsequent events, demonstrate that
suppressing certain "fighting faiths" is fundamentally inconsistent
with our First Amendment values and principles. 76
Interconnectivity and compression will create new regulatory
complexities and new risks of transborder violence and unlawful
activity. However, these characteristics also create a more globally
oriented marketplace of ideas. Altering the incitement standard by
eliminating or diluting the imminence standard-a method suggested
by many academics-may have substantial speech-restrictive effects
in this emerging forum. In any event, even if American incitement
standards were changed to outlaw terrorist advocacy, this would not
solve the problem of terrorist incitement in the global theater. 77 The
Internet is a transnational medium of expression, which means that
nothing short of an international treaty or other agreement would be
wholly effective in terms of regulating extremist rhetoric. 78 Rather
than dilute the incitement standard, the government ought to rely on
existing prohibitions on harmful conduct (i.e., federal espionage and
other national security laws) and effective law-enforcement strategies
that take into account the unique complexities of the global theater.
There is an additional complexity with regard to incitement in
the global theater. The foregoing discussion assumes that some legal
75.

Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 971 (2010).

76. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.").
77. Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2002).
78. See id. at 38 ("An extradition treaty offers the best hope for bringing to justice the
disseminators of Internet hate speech.").
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process will apply to the inciting citizen-speaker, and that his
expression will enjoy at least some First Amendment protection. In
the global theater, however, these are not certainties. In that theater,
a citizen can incite domestic and foreign violence from across the
globe. The domestic speaker, located on U.S. soil, will presumptively
enjoy basic due process and First Amendment speech protections. But
will the foreign citizen-inciter be entitled to similar protections?79
Consider the case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, who had dual Yemeni
and U.S. citizenship. The U.S. government accused Al-Aulaqi, who
resided in Yemen, of inciting violence against its domestic and foreign
interests, in part by posting videos and other materials on the
Internet. 80 Although the government claimed that he provided more
tangible forms of material aid to terrorists in the United States and
abroad, those claims were never established in any judicial process. 81
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration targeted Al-Aulaqi for
execution and subsequently killed him in a drone attack in Yemen. 82
Prior to the drone strike, Al-Aulaqi's father brought a lawsuit as next
friend, asking the court to rule that, outside the context of armed
conflict, the government can carry out the targeted killing of an
American citizen only as a last resort to address an imminent threat
to life or physical safety.s3 The lawsuit also asked the court to order
the government to disclose the legal standard it uses to place U.S.
citizens on government killlists. 84 A district court dismissed the action
on justiciability grounds, ruling that the plaintiffs father lacked
standing to challenge the targeted-killing order on his behalf. 85
While Al-Aulaqi's case raises some obvious Fifth Amendment
due process concerns, it also raises less commented-upon First
Amendment free speech concerns. It is not clear to what extent the
order targeted a citizen for extrajudicial killing based upon allegedly
inciting communications. Indeed, under the federal government's

79. The Supreme Court has assumed, but never explicitly held, that U.S. citizens are
entitled to some First Amendment free speech protection while abroad. E.g., Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (finding that, even assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections
reach beyond the boundaries of the United States, Agee's First Amendment claim has no
foundation).
80. Eric Lipton, U.S.-Born Cleric Justifies the Killing of Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2010, at A10.
81. Charlie Savage, Lawyers Seeking to Take Up Terror Suspect's Legal Case Sue U.S. for
Access, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A4.
82. Scott Shane, A Legal Debate as C.I.A. Stalks a U.S. Jihadist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010,
at Al. With regard to the drone attack, see Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 10.
83. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 35.
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approach, it is not clear that a speaker must be engaged in violent or
terrorist-supporting conduct in order to be the subject of an
extraterritorial execution order. In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Humanitarian Law Project, discussed below, the
government might claim that speech alone, if coordinated in some
fashion with terrorists, constitutes adequate grounds for targeted
execution. 86
Obviously, without some form of judicial review, we cannot
know whether the speech in question meets the incitement, material
support, or any other legal standard. Although the Obama
Administration claims that the order was based, at least in part, on
tangible support that Al-Aulaqi provided to terrorists, neither that
claim nor any other will ever be subject to any standard of proof in a
judicial proceeding. It thus remains possible that the U.S. government
may issue an order directing the killing of a U.S. citizen living abroad
for inciting violence through rhetoric posted on the Internet or
through emails sent to domestic audiences advocating violence against
the United States. However, such an order would be inconsistent with
the First Amendment's broad protection for mere advocacy of unlawful
action. In the global theater, we must ensure that extrajudicial
punishments are consistent with free speech protections. Those
citizens who take up arms and otherwise fight on behalf of U.S.
enemies are subject to detention and perhaps other punishments.
However, the First Amendment protects those who utter incendiary
remarks on the Internet or engage in the mere advocacy of violent
action.
Interconnectivity and compression will facilitate the
transmission of transborder, incendiary rhetoric and incitement in the
global theater. In rare cases, the government may prosecute domestic
speakers for incitement under traditional First Amendment
standards. As the global theater develops, there will likely be
continued calls for dilution of First Amendment standards relating to
incitement. Government officials may also resort to extrajudicial
measures to combat the threat from transborder incitement. The
challenge will be to fashion an approach that protects the nation's
domestic and foreign interests from harm, while simultaneously
preserving the civil liberties of U.S. citizens-regardless of where they
happen to be located. As the Al-Aulaqi case shows, the United States
is still seeking that balance.
86. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (noting that the
material support law covers only speech communicated "to, under the direction of, or in
coordination with" foreign terrorist organizations); see also discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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B. Enemy-Aiding Expression
In the global theater, a potentially expansive category of
transborder, enemy-aiding expression may assist, support, or lend
legitimacy to terrorists and other enemies of the nation. This
expression will pose unique challenges to national security and foreign
diplomacy. This Section applies First Amendment doctrines and
principles to three types of enemy-aiding expression, as defined
below-digitally distributed domestic dissent, expressive activity
involving
designated
foreign
terrorist
organizations,
and
cybertreason. 87
1. A Basic Definition
A basic definition of enemy-aiding expression will facilitate the
analysis. We might broadly define enemy-aiding expression as follows:
any expression or association that aids or furthers the causes of
enemies of the state.ss This support or facilitation can be
demonstrated by (1) lending legitimacy to enemy causes or
organizations; (2) materially assisting enemies of the state in carrying
out their objectives; or (3) providing enemies of the state with
treasonous "Aid and Comfort." 89
I am not contending that, either together or separately, these
elements define a currently proscribed or unprotected category of
expression. 90 Indeed, I argue below that criminalizing speech on many
of these grounds, including that it merely legitimizes enemies of the
state, is fundamentally inconsistent with the First Amendment. 91
However, as a descriptive matter, these are the basic elements of a
general category of expression that has already begun to pose unique

87. See discussion of cybertreason infra Part II.B.4.
88. "Enemies of the state" include persons formally designated as enemy combatants and
persons or groups designated as terrorist threats by U.S. officials, as well as persons or groups
not formally aligned with designated enemies who are nevertheless committed to taking or
encouraging hostile action against the United States.
89. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (setting forth the elements of the crime of treason).
90. Thus, the listed elements do not comprise an unprotected category of expression like
incitement or obscenity. Rather, the task is to define and describe the sort of expression that may
be subject to regulation or prosecution owing to the aid or assistance it provides to enemies of the
state. Whether expression that falls within this category is protected or unprotected depends on
the context. Thus, speech that provides "material support" to terrorists is within the ambit of the
First Amendment, while treasonous expression would be unprotected.
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. Moreover, as explained below, the definition is
obviously overbroad in the sense that it would cover clearly protected expression such as
domestic political dissent.
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challenges to traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles in
the global theater.
Note that the definition of enemy-aiding expression excludes
pure conduct, including the provision of weapons, funds, or other
materials to national enemies. Application of national security and
other laws to these forms of conduct does not give rise to serious First
Amendment concerns. As discussed earlier, some inciting expression
could be enemy aiding under the above definition. However, as courts
already treat incitement as a distinct unprotected category of
expression, it will not be specifically addressed in this section. 92
Finally, while the definition of enemy-aiding expression might have
included the publication of confidential or secret government
information, such publication raises distinct First Amendment free
speech and press concerns and is therefore discussed separately
below. 93
2. Domestic Rhetoric, Symbolism, and Dissent
Particularly during wartime or other national emergencies, a
range of domestic dissent, incendiary rhetoric, symbolic acts, and
direct praise for the nation's enemies and their causes could assist
U.S. enemies at home and abroad. A substantial amount of domestic
dissent and political advocacy might assist, embolden, or legitimize
the nation's enemies. This will become a more acute concern in the
global theater. As explained in Part I, as a result of interconnectivity
and compression, purely domestic dissent and contention will often
quickly become matters of global concern and notoriety. These
characteristics will increase the global salience of otherwise local
statements and communications.
In the global theater, almost any statement critical of the
government, the nation, or its ideals can be broadcast rapidly and
widely in a manner that could effectively aid, embolden, or legitimize
national enemies. Thus, for example, bigoted statements by people
vocally opposed to building an Islamic center in Manhattan might well
anger and embolden foreign terrorists and foreign leaders. Sharp
criticisms of President Obama, particularly during wartime, might be
of immediate use to U.S. enemies both at home and on foreign
battlefields. The same might be true of domestic war protests, flag
burnings, speeches favoring the election of antiwar candidates,
statements of religious bigotry that cast Muslims and other religious
92.
93.

See discussion of incitement in the emerging global theater supra Part II.A.2.
See discussion infra Part II. C.
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adherents as evildoer~ or murderers, and even editorials that defend
the basic rights of enemy combatants or foreign terrorist groups. Even
the previously described Koran-burning event has been characterized
as enemy-aiding expression. According to President Obama and other
high-level cabinet and military officials, the Florida pastor's plan to
burn a copy of the Koran not only threatened the safety of U.S. troops
abroad, but it was also likely to serve as a "recruitment bonanza" for
al-Qaeda and other enemies. 94
As discussed below, the government might argue that some of
this speech is punishable because it is coordinated in some fashion
with designated enemies of the state. 95 Putting that situation aside for
the moment, however, the government lacks the authority to suppress
independent, domestic political expression solely because its content
might somehow aid the enemy. 96 This ought to be the case whether or
not the domestic speaker intends by his rhetoric or symbolic act to
undermine American foreign or domestic interests. 97 As Eugene
Volokh has observed, under traditional First Amendment doctrines
and principles "much· speech that does help the enemy must remain
constitutionally protected."98
In the global theater, including during wartime, it is
imperative that Americans retain the right to evaluate their
government and to engage in political debate. This is true even if the
transborder expression might appreciably weaken U.S. citizens'
resolve or assist enemies by emboldening or legitimizing them to some
extent. A contrary rule would imperil a vast amount of public political
debate in the United States. Punishing or restricting domestic rhetoric
and dissent on the ground that it might aid the nation's foreign
enemies would curb citizen self-government by limiting participation
in debates of global concern.

94. Cave & Bamard, supra note 4.
95. See infra notes 96-99_and accompanying text.
96. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) ("If the First
Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of
citizens, for simply engaging in political speech."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people" (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (arguing that
domestic antiwar speech should "probably" be protected, since it may "contribute valuable
arguments to an important public debate").
97. See Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (noting the dangers of reliance upon an intent
standard in this and other contexts).
98. Id. at 1341.
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3. Providing ''Material Support" to Foreign Terrorists

As noted in Part I, in the global theater U.S. citizens will
increasingly interact with aliens beyond our borders in a variety of
political, humanitarian, cultural, and other endeavors. Some of these
transborder relationships will involve persons or groups that the
federal government has officially designated as terrorists. In various
online forums, speakers will also have opportunities to disseminate
favorable messages and information regarding both designated and
unofficial national enemies. Insofar as these and similar forms of
speech and association might aid, embolden, or legitimize these
enemies, will they be protected under the First Amendment?
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court
held that federal laws barring the provision of "material support" to
groups the State Department has labeled "foreign terrorist
organizations" do not violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech
and freedom of association guarantees, either facially or as applied to
citizens' lawful speech that is "coordinated" with such groups. 99 The
expression at issue in Humanitarian Law Project consisted of advising
and training foreign groups such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on peaceful and lawful means of
resolving their political grievances.l 00 Among other things, U.S.
citizens wished to work with these groups to teach them how to file
petitions with the United Nations.l 01 According to the Court, so long
as this sort of expression is "coordinated" with the disfavored groups,
the government may constitutionally proscribe it under the material
support provisions-even if the speakers did not specifically intend to
further the organizations' illegal and violent enterprises_102
Depending in part upon how it is interpreted and applied,
Humanitarian Law Project may set a very bad precedent for the
treatment of transborder expression and association. The majority
opinion is arguably inconsistent with several fundamental First
Amendment principles.l 03 At a broad level, the Court's decision is in
99. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13, 2730-31 (2010).
100. ld. at 2713-14.
101. Id. at 2729-30.
102. Id. at 2717-18, 2726. Under the relevant provisions, it is enough that the speakers
provide material support knowing that the recipient is a foreign terrorist organization. The law
does not require a specific intent to aid violent or other terrorist causes. ld. at 2717.
103. For criticisms of the decision, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEWAR ON TERROR 60-62 (2003) (comparing "material support"
prohibitions in the context of "cutting off funds for terrorism" with association with the
Communist Party during the Cold War era and noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly
ruled that that the Constitution prohibits punishment for association absent proof that an
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deep tension with traditional interpretations of the First Amendment,
which emphasize a commitment to protecting political speech and
truth seeking through deliberation while also expressly rejecting the
imposition of guilt by association.l 04 As Justice Breyer argued in
dissent, a long line of precedent precludes governments from imposing
content-based restrictions on citizens' relations with officially
disfavored persons or groups or criminalizing mere association with
them.l 05 Indeed, transformative twentieth-century free speech battles,
which often centered on ideological restrictions on radical, socialist,
and communist speech and association, teach that foreign ideologies
ought to be met with robust counterspeech rather than governmental
suppression. 106 Yet, Humanitarian Law Project places no burden
whatsoever on the government to demonstrate that citizens are
actively and intentionally engaged in a joint venture with enemies of
the state whose purpose is to inflict harm or engage in violence.
Instead, the decision effectively allows Congress to criminalize
peaceful, political expression and association in part on the ground

individual specifically intended to further the unlawful ends of the group"); Wadie E. Said, The
Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 588-92 (2011) (arguing that
credibly linking charitable contributions to terrorist violence for § 2339B prosecutions sets the
stage for "an extended discussion of foreign policy in the courtroom" for which courts are illequipped to handle); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at-and
Beyond-Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1579 (2010) (arguing that material support
prohibitions, as interpreted by the government, appear to prohibit U.S. residents from engaging
in "pure political speech" that promotes "lawful and nonviolent activity"). For a general defense
of the law's constitutionality and application, see generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism:
Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 101), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1777371 (arguing that the decision in Humanitarian Law Project has "roots in
the Framers' concerns about foreign influence" and has "parallels with constitutional
justifications for professional regulation").
104. See sources cited supra note 96. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 908 (1982) (''The right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because
some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is
not protected."); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ("If there were a similar
blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would
indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired ...
."); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (stating that the State may not "seize[ ] upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a
criminal charge," in lieu of prosecuting individuals for "violations of valid laws").
105. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2732-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 2738 ("To apply [the majority's argument] to the teaching of a subject such as
international human rights law is to adopt a rule of law that, contrary to the Constitution's text
and First Amendment precedent, would automatically forbid the teaching of any subject in a case
where national security interests conflict with the First Amendment.").
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that it might lend some aid or legitimacy to designated foreign
terrorist organizations.I07
Although the Court sought to carve out a safe haven for speech
that is not coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations, its
decision rests on principles of fungibility, legitimacy, and diplomacy
that might also apply to at least some "independent" political
expression transmitted in the global theater. The Court reasoned that
words and more tangible forms of support, including cash, are
essentially "fungible" resources insofar as terrorist organizations are
concerned.1°8 Specifically, it equated words and weapons in two
distinct respects. First, the Court claimed that speakers who provide
assistance in the form of legal instruction or petition-filing activities
will enable the benefited groups to channel organizational resources to
more violent activities. 109 The Court reasoned that since terrorist
organizations do not segregate their funds, teaching the leaders of
such organizations how to navigate international law and processes is
essentially the same thing as contributing to the organizations'
violent-activities funds.1 10 Second, the Court concluded that foreign
terrorist organizations might engage in tactical and opportunistic
behavior.l 11 For example, such groups might participate in speech and
associational activities intended to advance their lawful causes at the
United Nations "as a means of buying time to recover from short-term
setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately
preparing for new attacks." 11 2
Even if it's true that some designated foreign terrorist
organizations engage in this sort of behavior, the broad proposition
that words can be equated to weaponry remains antithetical to the
First Amendment. Indeed, accepting this proposition might require
that we revisit the First Amendment's broad protection for a range of
potentially harmful expression and expressive associations.
In general, under the First Amendment, advocacy, training,
and collaboration are properly viewed as means of persuasion,
instruction, or pursuit of common causes, rather than as potentially
dangerous commodities one might use to further violent ends.
However, the Court's approach in Humanitarian Law Project
107. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 32-40 (arguing that the Humanitarian Law
Project decision preserves "safe harbors" for independent advocacy, scholarship, journalism,
human rights monitoring, and legal representation).
108. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
109. ld.
110. Id.
111. ld. at 2729-30.
112. ld. at 2729.
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presumes that citizens who wish to engage in training and other
associative endeavors with disfavored foreign organizations are
always dupes, and that no good can come from such transborder
relationships.l 13 The Court's logic is also inconsistent with the
principle that speech may not be restricted or suppressed solely on the
ground that an audience might use it for some improper purposeincluding, presumably, for obfuscation or delay. 114 Finally, although
the Court concluded that the material support provisions regulated
speech, by treating words as a form of material support the Court
blurred the distinction between conduct and expression.l 15 Under that
distinction, while the government may freely regulate the tangible
effects of harmful conduct, it must tread more carefully insofar as
words and other expressive forms are concerned. 116
As noted, the Court stated that the material support laws did
not apply to "independent" political speech. 117 However, the majority's
fungibility reasoning would appear to apply with full force to much of
the ordinary domestic enemy-aiding expression discussed above. If
words alone may constitute a form of material support, then it is not
clear why even "independent" expression by U.S. citizens on behalf of
or in support of terrorists could not be criminalized.
Indeed, as noted earlier, a substantial amount of domestic
dissent and contention may be useful to national enemies. A video file
of an American citizen burning the Koran could prove far more useful
to al-Qaeda than a brief filed on its behalf in a U.S. court or a petition
filed on its behalf at the United Nations. Moreover, a speaker or
journalist who independently posts the musings of a radical al-Qaeda
cleric denouncing the United States and advocating violence against
its people would arguably allow the organization to channel its
resources to more violent purposes. It might also facilitate the group's
ability to attract "funds," "financing," and "goods" from other
sources.1 18 Under the Court's fungibility principle, the government

113. See Margulies, supra note 103, at 4 (observing that some foreign terrorist organizations
"use truces as tactical devices" and capitalize on "information asymmetries").
114. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(invalidating a municipal ban on posting of "for sale" or "sold" signs on homeowners' properties,
which was designed to prevent "the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated
community").
115. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724 (differentiating speech that conveys a
"specific skill" from speech that imparts "general or unspecialized knowledge").
116. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (providing limited circumstances
in which govemment can regulate free expression).
117. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726, 2730.
118. Id. at 2726 n.6 (quoting McKune Affidavit).
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could criminalize much of the domestic dissent and political
contention discussed in the previous section.
The Court sought to deflect such concerns by noting that the
material support provisions only apply to speech and association that
are "coordinated" with designated foreign terrorist organizations. 119
By contrast, independent expression, such as that described above,
would presumably enjoy a safe harbor. However, the Court did not
clarify why "coordination" was constitutionally dispositive and, more
importantly, failed to actually define the distinction between
"coordinated" and "independent" expression.1 20 If, as the Court
expressly stated, it is legal for citizens to join foreign terrorist
organizations as members, then what level of "coordination" would
run afoul of the material support provisions? 121 What sort of
relationship between a speaker and a designated foreign terrorist
organization would subject the speaker to liability for peaceful
expression and association ?122
The Humanitarian Law Project Court also concluded that
peaceful and lawful political expression, when coordinated with a
foreign terrorist organization, may be criminalized on the ground that
it might lend "legitimacy" to terrorist causes. 123 Again, especially
without some clear idea of what "coordination" entails, it is difficult to
compare this type of legitimating expression to other forms of
domestic speech that might also legitimize the nation's enemies. In
the emerging global theater, any digital soapbox orator may lend
credibility or "legitimacy'' to terrorists or their causes simply by
posting flattering or laudatory videos and other information on the
Internet. Legitimacy and its attendant benefits would presumably
flow to the enemy regardless of whether the expression was
"independent" from or was "coordinated" with the beneficiary. 124 Thus,
119. Id. at 2726.
120. See id. at 2732-33, 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance upon
coordination and its failure to provide a workable definition distinguishing "coordinated" from
"independent" expression).
121. Id. at 2723.
122. One commentator claims that the Court was concerned only with "speech related to
agency." Margulies, supra note 103, at 19. However, the majority in Humanitarian Law Project
did not rely expressly upon agency principles or doctrines in fashioning the
coordinated/independent distinction. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721-23
(analyzing the statute in question using statutory interpretive methods apart from agency
principles).
123. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
124. See id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty with the legitimacy
principle in general and with the government's apparent claim that even some forms of
"independent" expression, including the filing of amicus briefs on behalf of enemies of the state,
might be covered by the material support provisions).
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like the fungibility principle, the legitimacy principle threatens to
sweep in a large swath of otherwise protected political expression. 125
Finally, the Court relied on foreign-affairs concerns in
upholding the material support provisions. 126 Specifically, it noted
that United States allies might "react sharply" if the government were
to permit citizens to collaborate in even peaceful endeavors with
common enemies. 127 As explained earlier, foreign offense is not an
adequate basis upon which to restrict or suppress domestic symbolic
acts like Koran-burning or incendiary communications made in the
heat of domestic political debates. 128 This is true even in cases where
such speech might complicate U.S. diplomacy. The fact that domestic
speech may alienate foreign allies is not a valid ground for restricting
lawful, peaceful speech between citizens and foreign organizationseven those organizations designated as "terrorists" by the federal
government.
Depending on how the decision is interpreted and applied,
Humanitarian Law Project may undercut the central conclusion in the
previous section-namely, that domestic political expression cannot be
criminalized on the ground that it might aid the nation's enemies. In
the emerging global theater, citizens' expression and association will
more frequently intersect with foreign affairs and national security
concerns. Under the Court's gauzy "coordination" standard, citizens
who collaborate with designated foreign terrorist organizations on
foreign humanitarian projects, lawyers who file amicus briefs in U.S.
courts on behalf of designated enemies of the state, individuals who
post speeches and videos on the Internet that praise the nation's
enemies, and domestic newspapers that provide editorial space to
targeted enemies may all be engaging in felonious enemy-aiding
expression. 129
If that is so, the chances that political, humanitarian, national
security, and other critical transborder dialogues will be chilled or
suppressed in the global theater will increase substantially. Whatever
political and diplomatic decisions officials might take with regard to
engagement with hostile foreigners and regimes, it is critically
important that the First Amendment be interpreted and understood
125. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 30 (attempting to draw a distinction between
"functional and ideational senses" of "legitimacy," and arguing that the majority in
Humanitarian Law Project was actually only concerned with the functional sense of the term).
126. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
127. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726.
128. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
129. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 32-40 (interpreting Humanitarian Law Project as
placing such independent speech activities in statutory "safe harbors").
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such that channels of communication between citizens and aliens,
including even hostile aliens, remain as open as possible. This does
not mean, of course, that restrictions on such contacts are never
appropriate. However, any restrictions ought to be narrowly tailored
to prevent intentional efforts to further violent ends, rather than
broad measures designed to cut off all contact with certain disfavored
aliens or groups of aliens. Our First Amendment will have to be more
protective of foreign contacts and collaborations than this if it is to
retain its usefulness and vigor in the twenty-first century.l 30
The Court has made its ruling. It has chosen not to force the
government to demonstrate that citizens' speech to and association
with designated foreign terrorist organizations meet the exacting
standards for incitement to unlawful action. 131 However, there are at
least two things Congress can do that would narrow the scope of the
material support laws and would thereby help to preserve
opportunities for cross-border engagement and association.
First, Congress could codify a standard with respect to
"coordinated" expression that requires prosecutors to prove that a
close agency relationship or a similar working relationship exists
between citizens and designated foreign terrorist groups. This would
serve to clarify which types of relationships or associations are being
criminalized, narrow the scope of the prohibition to the most
dangerous and harmful joint enterprises, target a form of conduct
rather than pure speech, and ensure that "independent" domestic
political expression cannot be the object of prosecution. Second,
Congress could codify an intent standard that would criminalize
otherwise protected speech and association only when "the defendant
knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization's
unlawful terrorist actions." 132 These amendments would bring the
"material support" provisions closer to affinity with long-standing
First Amendment principles, and they would ensure that the
transborder channels of communication between citizens and aliens
remain as open as possible in the global theater.

130. See generally Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward
a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941 (2011) (supporting a more cosmopolitan
First Amendment approach that embraces cross-border information flow and protects speech and
other First Amendment interests domestically and abroad).
131. See Owen Fiss, The World We Live In, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 295, 306 (2011) (arguing that
material support provisions must meet incitement standards set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio).
132. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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4. Cybertreason
Treasonous expression is perhaps the most dangerous form of
enemy-aiding communication. Under the Constitution and federal law,
any person owing allegiance to the United States who "adheres" to the
enemy and through some "overt act" provides it with "[a]id and
[c]omfort" may be found guilty of treason. 133 In addition to perhaps
constituting the provision of material support (as discussed above),
certain forms of speech or association favoring the nation's enemies
may constitute treasonous adherence and the provision of aid and
comfort. 134
In the global theater, application of the Treason Clause and
related federal criminal laws to enemy-aiding expression could give
rise to significant First Amendment concerns. 135 Treasonous
expression could take many forms, including pure speech and symbolic
acts. A citizen speaker who reveals state secrets to foreign enemies
might be found guilty of treason. 136 Citizens who travel abroad and
meet with foreign enemies or principals in an effort to undermine U.S.
policies could also be liable under the strict letter of federal treason
laws. 137 The same fate might befall citizens who travel abroad to
demonstrate as "human shields" against U.S. military campaigns. 138
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. The clause reads, in full, "Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." Id. The federal treason statute
provides:
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is
guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years
and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding
any office under the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006).
134. See generally Bell, supra note 14, at, 1005-06 (identifying a "treacherous gap" between
clearly treasonous behavior established by courts and protected criticism of government action).
135. See id.
136. Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (upholding criminal punishment
for publishing confidential information in violation of governmental restrictions).
137. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1004 (citing as a possible example Jane Fonda's activities in
Vietnam).
138. See Gabriel H. Teninbaum, American Volunteer Human Shields in Iraq: Free Speech or
Treason?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 139, 158 (2004) (arguing that "human shields" may
have acted treasonously, but that for several reasons likelihood of prosecution for treason was
low). Thus far, courts have rejected free speech arguments in human shield cases. See Clancy v.
Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that sanctions
imposed for travel to Iraq in violation of executive order restricted conduct rather than speech);
Karpova v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d 459, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that enforcement of
regulations restricting travel to Iraq did not give rise to any First Amendment claim and, that
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However, the greatest potential threat to free speech in the
global theater could arise from the application of treason laws to
modern forms of propagandizing on behalf of the nation's enemies.
This would include posting or linking to speeches by terrorist groups
and their leaders, distributing messages or information that support
enemies' violent or nonviolent causes, and defending national enemies
from criticism online. 139 No court has ever addressed whether a
speaker may be convicted of cybertreason for posting enemy
propaganda or other forms of enemy-aiding expression on the
Internet.
The notion that the government might pursue such a treason
prosecution in such circumstances is not as far-fetched as it may
sound.l 40 Indeed, during the World War II era, several courts held or
strongly suggested that propaganda and other expression conveyed on
behalf of the nation's enemies might be sufficient grounds for a
treason conviction. 141 As commentators have noted, under these
precedents a defendant's expression or expressive acts alone might
demonstrate "adherence" to the enemy and the requisite "overt act"
providing unlawful "aid and comfort."1 42
In the global theater, a much wider range of expression and
expressive acts might fall within the potential domain of the treason
laws. In the World War 11-era cases, citizens had to travel abroad in
order to use the enemy's communications networks and were engaged
in close employment relationships or other agency relationships with
enemy agents or governments. 143 With the advent of the Internet,

insofar as a traveler's actions as a human shield were expressive conduct, the travel regulations
satisfied First Amendment standards).
139. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1006-09 (positing a hypothetical "al-Qaeda Al," who posts
messages to his own blog that could benefit global terrorist networks).
140. See id. at 1010-26 (discussing elements of treason law, as interpreted and applied by
courts, in the context of Internet postings).
141. See D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) (affirming the conviction of
Imperial Japanese propagandist, alias "Ann" or "Orphan Ann"); Burgman v. United States, 188
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (affirming the treason conviction of a Nazi propagandist); Best v.
United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950) (affirming the treason conviction of another Nazi
propagandist); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (affirming the treason
prosecution of yet another Nazi propagandist); Chandler v. United States 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948) (affirming the treason conviction of Nazi propagandist, alias "Paul Revere").
142. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1012-26 (addressing application of treason requirements to
instances of pure speech); Volokh, supra note 14, at 1341-42 (addressing whether a speaker
could be punished for treason merely for making antiwar statements).
143. See Best, 184 F.2d at 135 (describing defendant's preparation of propaganda broadcasts
to the United States via shortwave radio); Gillars, 182 F.2d at 966 (noting that defendant helped
in preparation of German propaganda broadcasts to the United States); United States v.
Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568, 569 (D.D.C. 1949) (observing that defendant was employed by the
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physical relocation is not required in order to propagandize effectively.
Further, owing to the fact that terrorist networks do not operate on a
strict bureaucratic basis, it may be difficult to determine who is
aligned with them or who is adhering to them. 144 If "adherence"
roughly equates to the "coordination" standard discussed in
Humanitarian Law Project, and speech alone can constitute an "overt
act," then a wide swath of cyber-rhetoric and other expression may fall
within the ambit of the treason laws.
Humanitarian Law Project recently confirmed that even pure
speech, if somehow coordinated with the nation's enemies, might be
subject to criminal prosecution consistent with the First
Amendment. 145 However, consideration of the Treason Clause's
original meaning, postwar developments in First Amendment
doctrine, and concerns regarding the chilling potential of prosecutions
for cybertreason all weigh heavily against recognition of the globaltheater crime of cybertreason.
As other commentators have noted, punishing pure speech or
association as treason is inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Treason Clause, which the framers of the Constitution viewed
as a shield against prosecution for political expression. 146 Further, as I
argued earlier in the context of prosecution for "material support," the
contemporary scope of the treason laws ought to be measured against
the lessons of twentieth-century free speech debates.l 47 In particular,
we need to account for post-World War II developments with respect
to First Amendment doctrine. A far more speech-protective standard
has replaced the comparatively speech-restrictive "clear and present
danger" standard applied in World War II-era treason cases. 148 That
German government to prepare propaganda broadcasts to the U.S.), aff'd, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
144. See Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and International Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 297, 302-03 (2003) (describing the functional structure of contemporary terrorist
organizations).
145. See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
146. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888--1986, at 298--99 (1990) ("[S]trong arguments have been made that the Framers
did mean to forbid punishment of mere 'treasonable' words under any label; otherwise their
central goal of eliminating punishment for acts earlier viewed as 'constructive' treason would not
have been achieved.") (emphasis omitted); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE
UNITED STATES 143 (Greenwood Publ'g. Corp. 1971) (1945) (discussing framers' views that
Treason Clause would prevent "the suppression of political opposition or the legitimate
expression of views on the conduct of public policy''); Bell, supra note 14, at 1027-28 (arguing
that prosecution of pure speech subverts the original meaning of the Treason Clause).
147. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
148. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (setting forth the modern incitement
standard); Gunther, supra note 64, at 755 (referring to the Brandenburg formulation as "the
most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court").
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standard, which demands a showing by the government of likely and
imminent harm from potentially dangerous expression, 149 counsels
against prosecution for treason (resulting in a possible death sentence)
based solely upon expression that exhibits support for, adherence to,
or comfort for enemies of the state.
Moreover, from the postwar period to the present, the Supreme
Court has consistently expressed strong support for citizens' freedom
to criticize government and engage in political debate.l5° While it is
true that speech during wartime has at times been less robustly
protected than in peaceful eras, this historical fact does not counsel in
favor of the application of the treason laws to cyberpropaganda. 151 So
long as we are in a state of perpetual war (broadly defined), a
substantial amount of domestic political expression could come under
the formal letter of the nation's treason laws. As noted earlier, owing
to the characteristics of the global theater, liability for cybertreason
will cast a much wider net than treason's traditional domain. 152 If we
are to have robust political discussion in the global theater,
application of the treason laws, like application of the material
support laws, must be based upon something more than a speaker's
expression of sympathy for enemies or the possibility that speech
might aid their causes.
As in the material support context, speakers may combine or
conspire with enemies in a manner that threatens compelling national
security interests. Nothing said thus far would preclude prosecution
for the provision of tangible forms of aid, the receipt of funds for
services rendered to terrorists or other enemies, or otherwise
participating in joint criminal enterprises.
However, with regard to purer forms of speech or symbolic
conduct, prosecutions for cybertreason must be subject to narrow
constraints. Should courts have occasion to revisit the World War Hera treason decisions in global theater contexts, they should reject the
major premise of some of those cases that expression and expressive
association alone can support a treason conviction. 153 Instead, courts
should require that the government demonstrate some close

149. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
150. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269 (1964).
151. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THEWAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
152. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1032-34 (discussing overbreadth problems under current
treason law).
153. See generally id.
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relationship between the speaker and the enemy in order to sustain a
treason indictment.
Commentators have disagreed regarding the specific extent to
which a speaker must be affiliated with an enemy of the state such
that prosecution for treason would satisfy the First Amendment. 154 In
order to protect the widest possible range of expression in the global
theater, Congress and the courts ought to require close employment
and agency relationships, which demonstrate a sufficient connection
and adherence to the enemy. 155 The relationships in some of the World
War II era cases involved traveling to foreign countries, using enemy
broadcast equipment, and taking specific instructions from enemies. 156
Travel abroad need not be a requirement; as noted, speakers can
participate in joint enterprises today without ever leaving their desks.
However, prosecutors should have to prove an overt act other than the
posting of enemy-aiding videos or other speech on the Internet,
independent translation of enemy messages, or the communication of
statements that advocate terrorism or praise terrorist methods or
results.
For example, the requisite relationship might be present where
the speaker establishes a dedicated website at the request of an
enemy person or organization, provides technical support for enemy
propaganda efforts, or posts messages as instructed by the enemy
organization. These acts, which more closely resemble the provision of
tangible assistance and material resources than pure speech, may be
used to establish the requisite collaboration between the speaker and
enemy. Speech in furtherance of the relationship, including the
transmission of operational plans and technological and other
information concerning bomb making, could also be considered
evidence of treasonous intent. In no circumstance, however, would
speech that merely favors, praises, legitimizes, or offers ideological
support for enemy causes come within the domain of the nation's
treason laws.
In the global theater, potentially treasonous expression will
proliferate along with the communications networks that carry it to
far-flung global audiences. As a general matter, the crime of
154. Compare id. at 1040-41 (suggesting that an employment standard should be used to
demonstrate "adherence" to the enemy), with Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (suggesting that the
proper test might be whether speaker was being paid by the enemy or otherwise coordinated his
activities with the enemy).
155. See, e.g., Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United
States 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568, 569-70
(D.D.C. 1949), af{'d, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
156. See, e.g., Best, 184 F.2d at 135; Gillars, 182 F.2d at 966; Burgman, 87 F. Supp. at 569.
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cybertreason ought to be rejected as inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Treason Clause and the postwar development of First
Amendment doctrine relating to political expression. Courts should
limit the scope of the treason laws to cases in which the government
demonstrates a close agency-like relationship between the domestic
speaker and the enemy. Narrowing the interpretation of the Treason
Clause in this manner will ensure that both our domestic and
transborder marketplaces of ideas remain robust, while also allowing
officials to pursue those engaged in unlawful and dangerous enemyaiding joint enterprises.

C. The Distribution of Government Secrets in the Global Theater
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, the emergence of the global
theater will significantly complicate the government's ability to
control and maintain even its own secrets. Governments will of course
not be powerless to protect state secrets and other confidential
information in the global theater. Officials can prosecute leakers
under espionage, confidentiality, and other national security laws.
Thus, individuals like Private Bradley Manning, who allegedly leaked
war and diplomatic information to the website WikiLeaks, will not
avoid prosecution and potential punishment. 157 However, governments
all over the world will have a much more difficult time maintaining
control over the publication and dissemination of confidential and
secret information, particularly once it is in the hands of foreign
recipients.
One of the unique problems in the global theater is the ease
with which an American leaker can quickly deliver confidential
information to a foreign distributor, who then disseminates the
information on the Internet. There are a number of legal and practical
obstacles to U.S. prosecutions of what is shaping up to be a new kind
of global press.
First, there are jurisdictional concerns and issues relating to
the extraterritorial application of U.S. national security and other
laws. It seems reasonably clear that the Espionage Act of 1917, the
statute that has most often been discussed in connection with Julian
Assange's
possible prosecution,
applies
to
extraterritorial
dissemination of government secrets (by both citizens and aliens). 158
157. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36--37 (1984); Robert C. Post, The
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (1984); see also Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1980).
158. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1932) (U.S. criminal laws
generally extend to citizens residing abroad); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)
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Second, even if the United States were to indict Assange, it is not clear
that the foreign government holding him would deliver him to
American authorities. 159 Third, in contemplating prosecution, the
government must at least consider the possibility that Assange will
follow through on his stated threat to disclose additional troves of
confidential information in his possession should the United States
pursue legal action against him. 16 Fourth, even if Assange is
extradited to the United States and successfully prosecuted, the
leaked cables and other information cannot now be retrieved and
cordoned off from public view. Thus, U.S. officials must ask whether
any prosecution of Assange would ultimately be worth the effort.
Assuming that the United States is able to overcome these
various obstacles and proceed to prosecute Assange, serious First
Amendment issues will arise. The first issue is whether Assange, as a
foreign national, could claim any protection under the First
Amendment's Free Speech and Free Press Clauses. If he was in U.S.
custody and on U.S. soil, Assange might be able to invoke the
protections of the First Amendment. 161 I say "might" because the
Supreme Court has never decided whether a defendant who is
involuntarily in the United States may invoke the First Amendment
in a proceeding related to information distribution or other speech
activities abroad. 162 Assuming that the First Amendment does apply,

°

(fraud against a government corporation); United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197 (D. Mass.
1985) (stating that the Espionage Act applies to acts of foreign nationals abroad); United States
v. Helmich, 521 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[I]t is clear that the legislative intent
behind repeal of section 791 was to extend application of the Espionage Act to cover acts
committed anywhere in the world."). I am focusing here only on the Espionage Act. It is possible
that the government might also seek to prosecute under computer fraud or other laws.
159. See John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, British Court Denies Bail to Assange, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/europe/08assange.html (noting that both
Sweden and Britain, where Assange was being held at the time of this writing, have extradition
treaties with the U.S., but that extradition rulings may be appealed to the European Court of
Human Rights).
160. Id.
161. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 109 (1996) (noting that
under a "mutuality of obligation" approach to constitutional domain, "aliens are within the
sphere either when they are within the nation's territory or on specific occasions when the nation
attempts to exact obedience to its laws").
162. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990) (refusing to apply
the Fourth Amendment to the search of an alien's home abroad, even though the alien had been
brought to the United States and was subject to its laws there, because the alien had no other
connection to the United States); id. at 276-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the
defendant was entitled to at least some constitutional protections by virtue of his involuntary
presence in the United States); id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the defendant
was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections even though he was involuntarily within the
United States); id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens
should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and
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the question would be whether the government could prosecute
Assange and WikiLeaks for possessing and/or disseminating
confidential government materials.
Such a prosecution would be unprecedented. The United States
has never prosecuted anyone other than a government employee,
under the Espionage Act or other law, for merely receiving or
disseminating confidential information. It is true that in New York
Times u. United States ("Pentagon Papers Case'), 163 which focused
primarily on whether the government could impose a prior restraint
on the publication of potentially harmful information, some of the
Justices noted that Congress appeared to have authorized prosecution
of recipients and disseminators. 164 However, neither in that case, nor
in any since, has the government actually prosecuted a journalist or
other recipient of confidential information.
It is questionable whether such a prosecution would be
consistent with the First Amendment's free speech and free press
guarantees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that in
the absence of some form of active participation in informational theft
or other wrongdoing, the recipient of information of public concern
cannot be prosecuted for publishing it "absent a need of the highest
order." 165 The Court has reasoned that if the legal sanctions applicable
to leaking do not provide sufficient deterrence, then "perhaps those
sanctions should be made more severe." 166 The Court has also
observed that "it would be quite remarkable to hold" that an
punish them."). Perhaps a key distinction between Verdugo-Urquidez and Assange's potential
prosecution might be the fact that, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the alleged Fourth Amendment
violation took place abroad, while any First Amendment violation would occur at the moment of
Assange's indictment and prosecution within the United States. See id. at 264 ("For purposes of
this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico.").
163. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
164. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 736-39 (White, J., concurring); id. at 745
(Marshall, J., concurring).
165. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001). The government might argue that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, the Espionage Act makes knowing dissemination of
confidential materials a criminal offense and that Assange's sharing of information with the
press was a criminal offense. See United States v. Morrison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Md. 1985)
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) applies to individuals who leak classified material to the
press, because the recipients are "not entitled to receive [the classified material}"); see also
POSNER, supra note 74, at 109 ("[S]ince the Espionage Act does punish the communication of
material relating to national defense ... that could be used to injure the nation ... publication of
such material ... would seem ... to violate the act ....") (emphasis added). As noted below,
however, that theory would seem to apply with equal measure to press outlets such as The New
York Times and The Washington Post. The government might also argue that Assange entered a
conspiracy with Private Manning, who allegedly stole the government information, by providing
him with certain forms of assistance in disseminating the files. Prosecution for this sort of
criminal conduct would not raise serious First Amendment questions.
166. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.

172

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1:125

individual can be constitutionally punished for merely disseminating
information because the government failed to "deter conduct by a nonlaw-abiding third party."I67
These sentiments are clearly premised on the idea that
prosecution of information distributors will stifle or restrict the free
flow of information of public concern. Of course, the First
Amendment's protection of information distribution is not absolute.
For example, the government can restrain certain harmful or deadly
disclosures in adV-ance of publication. 168 Some might argue that
Assange and WikiLeaks are not entitled to any First Amendment
protection owing to the potential harm that they caused by
disseminating wartime logs and diplomatic cables. However, thus far
the logs and cables do not appear to constitute the kind of "crimefacilitating'' speech that lies outside of the First Amendment's
domain.l 69 Nor is it clear that the disclosures will, as Justice Stewart
stated in the Pentagon Papers Case, "surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." 170
Further, whatever one. might think of the tactics Assange and
WikiLeaks used, the information thus far disclosed has shed
invaluable light on important matters of global public concern.l 71 The
mere fact that the disclosures might harm the national interest is
itself not a sufficient ground for prosecution, particularly where the
disclosures relate to matters of such clear public concern. 172
Even if the United States could obtain custody of Assange and
overcome these strong First Amendment objections to prosecution,
there are several reasons why the government should not pursue this
167. Id. at 529-30; see also New York Times, 403 U.S. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(arguing that the responsibility for ensuring confidentiality rests with the executive).
168. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question
but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.").
169. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1217-18 (2005).
170. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Geoffrey R. Stone,
Government Secrecy v. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 203-04 (2007)
(arguing that to justify punishing the press for publishing confidential information, the
government must prove that the publisher knew that the information was confidential, that
publication would result in imminent and serious harm, and that publication would not
meaningfully contribute to public debate). The government has largely downplayed the
significance of the disclosures. See The Defense Department's Response, supra note 36 (noting
that the period covered in certain reports "has been well chronicled in news stories, books and
films ....").
171. The information regarding foreign diplomacy has shed light on pressing domestic and
international concerns. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Reports Detail
Iran's Aid for Iraqi Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/
worldlmiddleeast/23iran.!J.tml.
172. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 718-20; id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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route. Insofar as any prosecution would be based primarily upon
knowing receipt and publication of confidential information, there
would be little to distinguish the New York Times from WikiLeaks.
Thus, the damage to the functioning of the domestic press from the
threat of prosecution for mere dissemination of confidential
information could be substantial. Newspapers and other media might
be reluctant to report government secrets, even if they had no original
role in obtaining the information. If Assange is prosecuted as a
criminal conspirator, then members of the domestic press will have to
consider whether that theory applies to them as well. Government
whistleblowers might also be reluctant to come forward under these
circumstances. In sum, any short-term gain in terms of retribution or
deterrence could have long-term negative consequences for
governmental transparency and the free flow of information on
significant matters of public concern.
The prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks could also make the
U.S. government look ineffectual and weak in the eyes of foreign
regimes and international audiences. Worse, it may send conflicting
signals regarding the government's regard for the free flow of
information on the Internet. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
announced an "Internet Freedom" initiative, which touts the use of
new technologies to facilitate information sharing and democracy
across the globe.l 73 At the same time that the United States is
praising hackers who resist repressive regimes abroad, its government
would be seeking to prosecute an alien who used new technologies to
expose government secrets. If the Department of Justice pursues this
course of action in the WikiLeaks case or in some similar case, U.S.
credibility on Internet freedom, governmental transparency, and the
free transborder flow of information could be significantly
compromised.
Of course, the United States may well lose the case. Win or
lose, however, none of this effort and expense will change the fact that
the war logs and cables have been distributed and discussed across
the globe and now cannot be fully retrieved. This does not leave the
United States defenseless against a rogue publisher operating
thousands of miles away. Rather than pursue the recipients and
publishers, the government ought to ensure that its own controls and
safeguards respecting confidential information are substantively
adequate and are actually being enforced.
173. Internet
Freedom,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb
/cip/netfreedom/index.htm#hr (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (describing the State Department's
Internet Freedom initiative).
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE GLOBAL THEATER
As Part II showed, in the global theater, potentially harmful
expression will pose some unique First Amendment concerns. Recent
episodes involving the Koran-burning pastor, the cartoonist-in-hiding,
the cross-border associate of foreign terrorists, the rogue citizen-cleric
living abroad, and the foreign-information distributor also reveal some
broader lessons regarding freedom of speech, association, and press in
the global theater.
First, as the global theater continues to develop, we will need
to pay more attention to, and develop a more coherent sense of, the
First Amendment's important transborder dimension. Second, as the
examples discussed in Part II showed, certain traditional First
Amendment justifications, including marketplace of ideas and selfgovernance principles, will retain their importance and ought to
continue to operate in the emerging global theater. However, as the
global theater develops and expands, Americans will be called upon to
explain and defend some of our exceptional free speech protections.
Third, freedom of the press, broadly defined, will play a critical role in
the emerging global theater. Changes with respect to the identity,
functions, and ethics of the press will significantly affect global
information flow. Finally, speakers and distributors of information
will face a new set of threats to transborder information flow in the
global theater, including softer forms of governmental persuasion and
regulatory power, restrictions by private intermediaries, and
extrajudicial (or, perhaps, extralegal) forms of punishment for
potentially harmful expression.

A. The First Amendment's Transborder Dimension
In the global theater, a narrowly territorial or provincial
orientation with respect to the First Amendment will not help us
identify and resolve the most pressing twentieth-century problems
concerning global information flowY 4 Today, expression, association,
and information routinely cross and transcend territorial borders. As
noted earlier, traditional concepts such as proximity and incitement
must be adapted to a global theater shaped by characteristics of
interconnectivity and compression.1 75

174. See generally Zick, supra note 130, at 949-98 (describing and critiquing provincial
conceptions of the First Amendment).
175. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1027-28; Volokh, supra note 14, at 1341-42; Zick, supra note
68, at 34-36.
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In this environment, we can no longer view the First
Amendment as constituting a narrow set of restrictions on domestic
governance. This is especially true when the effects of incendiary
domestic communication may be felt half a world away; when foreign
hecklers can chill speech in domestic marketplaces; when speakers
can engage in real-time interactions with audiences without regard to
location; and when publishers can disseminate potentially harmful
information, including government secrets, from places well beyond
the practical and perhaps even the legal domain of the affected
government. In the global theater, we will need to expand the focus
regarding the First Amendment beyond its domestic aspects and
effects. To do so, we will need a conceptual and constitutional
framework for analyzing disputes that fall within the First
Amendment's transborder dimension.
This critical dimension will implicate a number of free speech
and association rights relating to transborder information flow. These
include the rights of citizens to (1) receive information from foreign
sources; 176 (2) engage in expressive activities beyond U.S. territorial
borders; 177 (3) forge lawful relationships with aliens located abroad; 178
(4) collaborate with alien persons or groups in lawful and peaceful
endeavors, including information dissemination; 179 and (5) engage in
robust cross-border exchange and dialogue.l 80
The Supreme Court has not embraced these First Amendment
liberties to nearly the same extent as their domestic counterparts, and
policymakers have historically discounted their importance. 181
However, these are the foundational liberties supporting twenty-first
century, transborder information flow. As such, they will play an
important role in shaping the application of First Amendment
doctrines in the global theater.
As Jack Balkin has argued, federal regulatory policies and
decisions will be critical to the future development of digitally
interconnected global-communication networks.1 82 Thus, much of the
work to be done in developing the global theater's infrastructure will

176. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-Q7 (1965).
177. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-Q9 (1981).
178. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 760, 768-69 (1972).
179. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987).
180. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765 (recognizing a First Amendment right to meet face-toface with aliens).
181. See Zick, supra note 130, at 982-87 (discussing judicial "quasi-recognition" of various
transborder liberties).
182. Balkin, supra note 19, at 428 (claiming that with regard to freedom of expression in the
digital age, "knowledge and information policy" concerns will displace constitutional ones).
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take place in the political branches and through the work of federal
regulatory agencies. In certain respects, government officials and
regulators have already begun to embrace the core precepts of a more
globally oriented First Amendment. For example, the State
Department recently touted Internet freedom and global information
flow as explicit U.S. foreign affairs policies. 183 However, transborder
issues will ultimately come to the courts as well. Thus, it will be
critically important for judges to recognize and incorporate the First
Amendment's transborder dimension into their analyses of globaltheater free speech, association, and press issues.
For example, although the expressive and associational activity
in Humanitarian Law Project crossed international borders, none of
the Justices even mentioned any of the precedents relating to
transborder First Amendment liberties. It is true that much of the
speech at issue in Humanitarian Law Project was purely domestic in
nature-namely, legal training in the United States, filing petitions at
the United Nations, and petitioning Congress. Further, the speakers
were all U.S. citizens who possessed First Amendment rights of their
own. However, the fact that their audiences and associates were
foreign individuals and entities appears to have substantially
influenced the Court's analysis and the outcome of the case. Indeed,
the majority made clear that its analysis with respect to speech
directed to foreign terrorist organizations did not necessarily apply to
domestic terrorist organizations. 18 4
But why should this necessarily be the case? It is not clear why
the Court's fungibility and legitimacy rationales would not apply with
full force to speech directed to potentially dangerous domestic groups,
audiences, and associates. 185 Providing material support to
homegrown terrorist organizations would seem to be equally, if not
more, troubling given the proximity of the potential wrongdoers to
American citizens, assets, and institutions. Perhaps the Court was
signaling that there is something akin to a foreign affairs exception to
the First Amendment's free speech and association protections.
However, such an exception would be flatly inconsistent with the
transborder liberties that the Court has already recognized. Other
than positing a possible distinction between foreign and domestic
organizations, the Court never acknowledged that the citizens' First
Amendment claims had any transborder element or dimension at all.

183. See Internet Freedom, supra note 173.
184. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
185. See supra notes 108--25 and accompanying text (discussing fungibility and legitimacy
rationales as applied to speech coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations).
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Similarly, the dissenters failed to note that the dispute implicated
fundamental First Amendment rights to enter relationships with
foreign persons and entities. As a result, in Humanitarian Law
Project, the Court missed an important opportunity to discuss and
clarify the First Amendment's transborder dimension. Specifically, it
failed to fully acknowledge the importance of the speech and
association at issue to the transborder flow of information and
transborder expressive association.
The First Amendment's transborder dimension will be much
more difficult to ignore in any prosecution of WikiLeaks or other
foreign-information distributors. Whether or not Julian Assange
possesses speech or press rights, it is clear that his substantial
American audience does. Thus, the First Amendment issues in such a
case are much broader than whether a foreign national can invoke the
speech or press protections of the First Amendment, or whether some
fine distinction can be drawn between WikiLeaks and The New York
Times. Any prosecution would directly implicate the developing
transborder marketplace of ideas. Regardless of the outcome, such a
case would likely have a profound effect on transborder information
flow and the development of the First Amendment's transborder
dimension.
In sum, courts and executive officials must act with awareness
that the right to distribute information has a transborder dimension.
In the global theater, transborder speech, association, and press
claims will likely proliferate. In this environment, the provincial or
narrowly democratic conception of the First Amendment, which is
defined exclusively with reference to U.S. territorial borders, will be
increasingly anachronistic. 186 In the years to come, courts and officials
will face important decisions regarding the contours of the First
Amendment's transborder dimension. As I have argued elsewhere,
U.S. officials ought to adopt a more outward-looking, cosmopolitan
orientation with respect to First Amendment liberties_IB7

B. Fundamental First Amendment Values in the Global Theater
Despite the extraordinary changes in our expressive
environment, we must not lose sight of certain core, traditional First
Amendment principles. In the global theater, we ought to maintain
our fundamental commitments to counterspeech, speaker autonomy,

186. See Zick, supra note 130, at 949-82 (describing precedents which adopt a provincial
orientation regarding the First Amendment).
187. Id. at 998-1022.
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and self-governance. However, we may have to reconsider the scope,
geographically and conceptually, of those commitments. In light of
interconnectivity and compression, we will have many opportunities to
consider, explain, and defend First Amendment free speech values to
diverse global audiences.
One of the principal lessons from early conflicts in the global
theater is that reliance upon traditional First Amendment principles
will be critical to preserving domestic speech rights as well as
encouraging and facilitating robust cross-border exchange. As
Humanitarian Law Project demonstrates, the First Amendment
values and principles that support limits on prosecutions for
incitement and treason remain important in the emerging global
theater. Traditional marketplace principles, including preferences for
counterspeech and social control over government regulation, must
retain their vitality in the global theater.
As we have seen, the need for tolerance regarding offensive and
intentionally provocative speech will take on global significance. 188
Moreover, as explained earlier, First Amendment doctrine does not
currently allow officials to suppress offensive speech merely because it
might have some indeterminate psychological or other negative impact
on some audience-wherever that audience happens to be located. 189
That does not render officials powerless to respond to offensive and
potentially incendiary transborder speech. Officials can and should
continue to use new technologies to counter extremist speech in the
global theater.1 90 In an era in which speech and association frequently
traverse or transcend territorial borders, justifications for expressive
freedom ought to take into account broader concerns regarding global
information flow, cross-border collaboration, and the global spread of
"democratic culture." 191 Granting robust protection to transborder
speech, association, and information distribution would serve a
number of traditional free speech values, including the facilitation of
citizen self-governance, truth seeking, speaker autonomy, and
checking governmental abuses of power wherever they occur. 192

188. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 10-11 (1988) (positing a
tolerance justification for freedom of speech).
189. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text (discussing free speech principles relating
to offensive expression).
190. See Thorn Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Uses Cyberspace to Rebut Messages Posted by
Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at AS.
191. See Balkin, supra note 19, at 2-6, 34-38 (explaining how transborder expressive
activity furthers democratic values).
192. See Zick, supra note 130, at 999-1004 (discussing First Amendment values in the
emerging global theater).

2012] FALSELY SHOUTING FIRE IN A GLOBAL THEATER

179

Further, transborder expression and association expose citizens to
persons, information, problems, and debates beyond their local
communities; expand opportunities for citizens' engagement and
participation in global affairs and humanitarian projects; foster
diverse channels of communication, which may generate mutual
understanding and respect; and create processes which may foster
worldwide respect for First Amendment values. These values are
rarely, if ever, discussed in judicial precedents or academic
commentary concerning transborder First Amendment issues.
Adopting this more expansive orientation with regard to the
First Amendment places the expressive activities of the Koran burner,
cartoonist, human-rights advocate, citizen inciting violence from
abroad, and foreign publisher in proper perspective. 193 In general,
Americans are no longer merely speaking to and associating with one
another in the confines of local, state, or national communities.
Sometimes intentionally and sometimes not, citizens are increasingly
involved in a robust transborder marketplace of ideas. That
marketplace is less homogenous than its domestic counterparts.
Further, First Amendment transparency and other self-governance
concerns extend to extraterritorial wars, intelligence operations
conducted abroad, and foreign diplomacy.
In many ways, we are now simply re-experiencing the growing
pains that attended the birth of the domestic marketplace of ideas.
Our commitment to core First Amendment free speech, association,
and press guarantees will be severely tested in the global theater. As
that theater develops, we will have many opportunities to explain and
defend America's exceptional commitments to such principles, often to
a deeply skeptical global community. Indeed, an important part of
transborder dialogue will involve explaining marketplace, selfactualization, self-governance, and tolerance principles to those who
do not share or fully understand them (including, unfortunately, some
people in the United States).1 94 The emergence of the global theater
has highlighted the extent to which First Amendment doctrines and
principles deviate from European and other international

193. See generally id. at 948-49 (discussing the need for a more cosmopolitan view of
transnational First Amendment rights).
194. In response to media inquiries from domestic and foreign news organizations regarding
Pastor Jones, the Koran burner, I was frequently asked to explain why the First Amendment
generally forbids the government from restricting even deeply offensive expression based solely
on its content. With regard to some of the uninformed domestic commentary on the Koran
burning, see sources cited supra note 48.
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standards. 195 For example, unlike many other democratic nations, the
United States values speaker autonomy over equality and dignitary
interests. 196 In the global theater, these differences, and the tensions
they sometimes create, will become a more prominent concern.
As we move deeper into the twenty-first century, First
Amendment norms and principles will compete against other
expressive systems across the globe. We ought to view this competition
as an opportunity, rather than as a burden or as an occasion for
nationalistic defensiveness. It is a salutary thing that Americans
reflect upon and debate the balance that has been struck under our
First Amendment. As the Koran burning demonstrates, however, if
indeed we are intent on retaining it, we will have to do a much better
job of explaining our First Amendment exceptionalism to diverse
global audiences.

C. Freedom of the Press in the Global Theater
In the global theater, the press will play a central role in the
transborder dissemination of information and will lead global
dialogues on a variety of pressing issues with transborder salience.
The press will face a variety of unique challenges in this emerging
theater. 197 One preliminary challenge is definitional (i.e., who or what
is a member of the "press"?). Members of the emerging global press
will have to report responsibly on topics of global concern. They will
confront professional and ethical concerns in their relationships with
distant and unfamiliar information sources. Finally, the global press
may face potential liability for disclosure of governmental secrets.
In the global theater, the press will continue to face
fundamental identity issues. Bloggers have already staked a claim to
the press mantle in the digital era. 198 New types of global information
intermediaries and outlets like WikiLeaks may also seek refuge under

195. See generally RONALD J. KROTOSZVNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, at xiv
(2006) (discussing the different global conceptions of freedom of speech).
196. See id. at 90-92 (summarizing the differing approaches of Canada and Germany).
197. For an excellent account of some of the challenges facing the press in a global society,
see LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW
CENTURY 6 (2010).
198. Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 399 (2006); Joseph S. Alonzo, Note, Restoring the Ideal
Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'y 751, 752 (2006); see also Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process
of Journalism in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2003)
(examining three possible approaches to defining "journalist").
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the First Amendment's press protections. 199 In addition to the
constitutional issues discussed earlier, 200 these identity claims will
create professional tensions. For example, mainstream media outlets
in the United States, some of whom have benefited substantially from
the WikiLeaks disclosures in terms of their own reporting, supported a
provision of a proposed federal law that would preclude organizations
like WikiLeaks from claiming press protection regarding the identity
of confidential sources. 20 1
Mainstream press outlets must carefully consider whether it is
wise to codify a definition of "journalist" or "press" that closely tracks
domestic norms and practices. Traditional press outlets may gain
some short-term advantage if global competitors are excluded from
such definitions-as would be the case if a much-desired federal shield
law for reporters passed. 202 However, limiting protections for new
global information intermediaries that do not function in traditional
ways could produce long-term disadvantages in terms of access to
governmental secrets and transborder information flow more
generally. As transborder information flow becomes more critical to
self-governance, transparency, and other First Amendment values, the
domestic press ought to start thinking more globally and less
provincially about its roles and functions.
As reporting and other communications transcend territorial
borders, the domestic press will also face new challenges with regard
to reporting on matters of global concern. One challenge is to ensure
that the domestic press devotes adequate resources to coverage of
international events and concerns. 203 Owing to the pressures (largely
financial) currently facing the press, this may require additional
infusions of public funding for pres_s. activity abroad. 204
Reporting on sensitive matters of global concern will be
another challenge for journalists operating in the global theater.
Religion-in particular, ideas and opinions regarding Islam-will be
one such concern. In the global theater, common language will not
always be enough to bridge national, cultural, and religious divides.
199. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (noting the difficulty of defining the
category of newsmen entitled to privilege).
200. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
201. Douglas Lee, Trying to Exclude WikiLeaks from Shield Law Stinks, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=23303.
202. See Paul Farhi, Wikileaks is Barrier to Shield Arguments, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
2010, at C1 (discussing how WikiLeaks affected legislation that would protect journalists from
being forced to reveal confidential sources).
203. See BOLLINGER, supra note 188, at 132-36 (noting funding and other challenges
affecting the international presence of the domestic press).
204. ld.
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Journalists are uniquely positioned to play an educational role in the
global theater. A more knowledgeable and responsible press can
encourage and facilitate respectful debate on sensitive matters, like
religion, that reach across deep cultural divides. In order to serve this
important function, however, reporting on religion and other
important global concerns must be as factual and neutral as possible.
For example, many journalists simply erred in referring to the
proposed Islamic center in lower Manhattan as the "Ground Zero
Mosque." 205 The label is both factually inaccurate and incendiary. To
face the challenge of reporting on such matters in the global theater,
journalists may need to improve their substantive training with
regard to transborder religious and cultural issues. In the global
theater, journalists will need to think more globally in terms of
audiences and cultures.
Another challenge facing the domestic press in the emerging
global theater relates to the sorts of relationships it will enter into
with private and governmental sources of information. The
whistleblower of yesterday (e.g., Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon
Papers Case) may be replaced by information intermediaries with
uncertain credentials and agendas (e.g., Julian Assange and
WikiLeaks). This new breed of intermediary may be thousands of
miles away and subject to the laws of foreign nations. It may be a
private venture or a foreign government, or a foreign government
masquerading as a private venture. In the emerging global theater,
journalists may need to reassess standards of journalistic ethics and
responsibility relating to their relationships with sources. The press
may need to hold some sources at arm's length. It may need to
scrutinize information with greater care, particularly when the source
appears to be suspect and the information may potentially be
damaging to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. 206
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, the press may be exposed to
greater criminal liability as a result of cooperating or collaborating
with foreign sources, persons, and organizations. As discussed earlier,
if history is any guide, the likelihood of a criminal prosecution of the
domestic press for merely disclosing information of public concern
appears to be rather slim. 207 Nevertheless, some of the theories that
officials are currently considering in connection with possible

205. See sources cited supra note 24 (discussing the inaccurate labeling of the Manhattan
mosque).
206. See ArthurS. Brisbane, Sharing Secrets at Arm's Length, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at
WK-8 (discussing the relationship between WikiLeaks and The New York Times).
207. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks leave little breathing space
between these actors and the domestic press. 208 Even if the
government were able to split hairs in a manner that relieves the
domestic press of criminal liability, the resulting uncertainty could
chill future reporting regarding governmental secrets.
Moreover, in the emerging global theater, the threat of
criminal liability is not limited to contexts in which individuals
disclose confidential government information. The domestic press
must also be mindful that any relationship or collaboration with
foreign terrorists or foreign-terrorist organizations could give rise to
criminal charges of "material support" or criminal conspiracy. Under
the reasoning of Humanitarian Law Project, a domestic editorial
board that makes print space available to a foreign terrorist may be
accused of providing "material support" to terrorists. The resulting
fear of criminal liability may interrupt or chill the free flow of
information in the global theater.
In sum, the press will be a critical transborder conduit of
information on matters of global concern. In the global theater, the
press will face identity, professional, and liability challenges. It ought
to face those challenges mindful of the globalization of the profession
and the unique characteristics of the theater in which it now operates.

D. New Threats to First Amendment Freedoms
Finally, in the global theater speakers and publishers will face
new threats to freedom of speech and the transborder dissemination of
information. Only some of these will emanate from the state, as in the
case of potential criminal charges against information distributors like
WikiLeaks. Other restrictions will arise from the conduct of nonstate
actors, including information intermediaries. Moreover, the global
theater may give rise to unique rule of law concerns regarding access
to judicial process for speakers located abroad. 209
In the global theater, speakers and publishers will continue to
face the usual challenges in terms of governmental restrictions,
regulations, and prosecutions. Authorities may be able to effectively
regulate some transborder and extraterritorial expression by pursuing

208. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. Domestic journalists are not the only
ones who face potential difficulties as a result of disclosure of confidential information.
Government employees may face penalties for viewing still-classified documents. Even jobseekers who post comments on the documents may face repercussions when they apply for
sensitive federal positions.
209. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi).
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domestic intermediaries such as internet service providers. 210 The
First Amendment implications of prosecuting WikiLeaks are critically
important. 211 However, we ought to be focusing more on the power of
nonstate actors to affect global information flow, and the power of
government actors to engage in various forms of "soft'' censorship. 212
An expanding category of intermediaries will likely become
targets of governmental pressure. For example, in an effort to restrict
or suppress some potentially harmful speech, officials may seek to
pressure intermediaries such as YouTube, Amazon, and PayPal to
deny service to certain speakers or publishers. Indeed, in the case of
WikiLeaks, U.S. officials initially pressed social networking and
financial intermediaries to deny service to the website in an effort to
shut it down or at least slow the release of confidential information. 213
These efforts were only marginally successful. It quickly became clear
that WikiLeaks had allies in the global information network. The
federal government's denial of service strategy precipitated a smallscale information war. Various hackers attacked social networking
and financial intermediaries, including through distributed denial of
service attacks. 214 In the global theater, efforts by government officials
to lean on information intermediaries will likely lead to new forms of
cybercivil disobedience and information activism in locations across
the globe. Moreover, information distributors like WikiLeaks possess
and will likely distribute encrypted flies of their caches, which can
then be released at different points in the interconnected global
network. 215 Thus, regardless of the actions officials may take, the
information itself will likely remain available for distribution.
However, unlike WikiLeaks, few speakers or publishers are
likely to have a global support network. This may render their
210. See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 18, at 68-79 (discussing regulation of information
intermediaries).
211. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
212. With regard to methods of "soft" censorship of Internet speech, see generally Derek E.
Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1926415.
213. See Michael Calderone, Lieberman Pressures Amazon to Drop WikiLeaks, YAHOO.COM,
(Dec. 2, 2010), http:l/news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thecutline/20101202/tc_yblog_thecutlinelliebermanpressures-amazon-to-drop-wikileaks; see also Bambauer, supra note 212, at 27-34 (discussing
efforts to censor WikiLeaks through persuasion and pressure).
214. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, The Oldest Hack in the Book, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2010, 5:46 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/12/the_oldest_hack_in_the_book.html
(discussing WikiLeaks supporters' attempts to deny Internet service to Visa.com and
MasterCard.com); David Sarno, 'Hactivists' Fight for Their Cause Online, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2010,
http:l/articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/11/businesslla-fi-cyber-disobedience-20101211
(discussing hackers' attempts to deny Internet service to Visa.com).
215. Somaiya, supra note 39.
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communications more vulnerable to private restrictions, which
government officials may play a role in imposing through soft forms of
persuasion.2 16 Owing to their private status, the decisions and policies
of intermediaries, such as YouTube and Amazon, are not subject to
legal or constitutional constraints. In the global theater, private
censorship may become an increasingly prevalent and effective
obstacle to transborder information flow. 217 If this occurs, arguments
in favor of reconsidering or abolishing the traditional public-private
distinction in free speech and other contexts may gain additional
force. 218
Finally, more general rule-of-law and freedom-of-speech
concerns will arise in the global theater. The most serious of these will
relate to speakers who reside beyond the territorial borders of the
United States. Citizens, who likely possess at least some First
Amendment rights abroad, may be subjected to new forms of summary
punishment. 219 The killing of the U.S.-Yemeni cleric Al-Aulaqi is an
example.22o It may well be that Al-Aulaqi engaged in treasonous or
other illegal conduct. However, targeted killing obviously takes the
matter away from the courts without any legal determination to that
effect. Under such circumstances, we cannot be certain whether the
speaker is being punished for protected speech or criminal conduct. In
many cases, the public may not even be aware that targeted killing
orders have been issued.
To be sure, courts may be ill-equipped to decide the underlying
merits of such orders. Still, there ought at least to be some check on
the government's ability to order the killing of a citizen based in part,
if not substantially, upon his protected expression. The characteristics
216. See John F. Burns & Miguel Helft, Under Pressure, You Tube Withdraws Muslim Cleric's
Videos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A16 (discussing how YouTube removed videos under
pressure from American and British officials); Ravi Somaiya, U.S. Islamic Web Site Is Taken
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at A5 (discussing an extremist Islamic website that was taken
down).
217. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 14 (2006) (discussing
how regulation of intermediaries allows the government to control speech over the Internet).
218. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 507
(1985) ("[T]he next major expansion in the protection of rights must be to limit infringements of
rights made by private entities. The Constitution's declaration of personal liberties must be
viewed as a code of social morals that may not be violated without a compelling justification.");
Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 103-04
(2004) (proposing that courts invoke the First Amendment to enjoin some nongovernmental
action that undermines public debate on matters of national policy).
219. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming citizens have free speech rights
abroad).
220. See Shane, supra note 82 (reporting the targeted killing of Al-Aulaqi by U.S. forces).
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of the emerging global theater may actually offer at least a partial
solution to the rule-of-law and justiciability problems associated with
the extraterritorial targeted killing of citizens. In its decision
dismissing Al-Aulaqi's father's lawsuit, the district court suggested
that Al-Aulaqi himself might have been permitted to appear via
teleconference to contest the order, rather than enter the United
States and risk certain arrest and detention. 221 Although
teleconferencing would not resolve all justiciability issues that might
arise in such cases and may not be an optimal forum for adjudicating
these matters, it would provide the citizen target with an opportunity
to appear in a U.S. court. Virtual process would at least allow the
target of an execution order to contest the legal and factual validity of
the order, as well as to raise any free speech claims.
In general, we ought to begin thinking about how best to
balance the rule-of-law and First Amendment concerns in such cases
with the need to protect national security. The answer may lie in
considering whether targeted killings are consistent with fundamental
norms of international law. 222 Whatever may be the source of free
speech rights for citizens, and even aliens, abroad, virtual or even
remote forms of legal process for speakers would be preferable to
extrajudicial, and perhaps illegal, execution orders.
CONCLUSION

Potentially harmful domestic, expressive activities increasingly
have transborder effects. In the global theater, increased
interconnectivity and the compression of space and time will enhance
speakers' ability to communicate offensive and incendiary messages
and to enter associations with disfavored and potentially dangerous
foreign organizations. Further, the distribution of government secrets
and confidential information may affect foreign audiences, foreign
affairs, and other nondomestic U.S. interests.
This Article addresses the First Amendment implications of
speakers falsely shouting fire in the global theater. The fact that such
speech reaches a worldwide audience certainly requires that speakers
and officials be aware of potential transborder effects, including
violent reactions in foreign nations and potential effects on foreign
221. Al·Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 n.4 (D.D.C. 2010).
222. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution
Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 231 (2010) (discussing the extent of the Constitution's
jurisdiction); Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 309 (2011) (arguing decisions regarding extraterritorial
actions should be based on fundamental norms of jurisprudence).
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diplomacy. However, it does not require the courts to revise traditional
doctrines relating to offensive, incendiary, inciting, and other forms of
potentially harmful expression. As the examples discussed in this
Article show, traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles
can adequately accommodate potentially harmful speech in the global
theater. Moreover, in general, traditional First Amendment
justifications ought to apply with full force to transborder expression
that offends, upsets, or otherwise affects foreign audiences.
We should also to resist the temptation to react to potential
foreign threats or effects by creating new limits on transborder speech,
association, and press activities. This includes new forms of guilt by
association, cybertreason, and new limits on global press freedoms.
Indeed, applying long-standing First Amendment principles and
protections with full force to domestic expression that has potentially
harmful transborder effects will serve to underscore a national
commitment to robust and exceptional free speech, association, and
press rights.
There are also more general lessons to draw from the globaltheater speech, association, and press controversies highlighted in this
Article. We need a more systematic and coherent understanding of the
First Amendment's transborder dimension. As the global theater
develops, rights to exchange information across borders, to speak to
and associate with aliens abroad, and to engage in expressive
activities beyond U.S. borders will become increasingly important. As
this occurs, courts, elected officials, agency personnel, speakers, and
members of the press ought to consider adopting a more cosmopolitan
orientation with regard to the First Amendment and its
justifications. 223 The press, in particular, will be critical to robust
transborder information flow. As the global theater emerges,
journalists will need to address fundamental identity, professional,
ethical, and legal issues in a manner that preserves their core
functions. Finally, in the global theater speakers, journalists, and
other information providers will face new regulatory challenges, such
as the denial of access and service by private information and
financial intermediaries, informal governmental pressure, and
extrajudicial punishments. As the First Amendment enters the second
decade of the twenty-first century, we ought to be thinking more
carefully and systematically about the implications of these and other
limits on transborder information flow.

223. See generally Zick, supra note 130, at 948--49 (arguing in favor of a cosmopolitan
conception of the First Amendment).
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